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THE EFFECT OF LENIENCY POLICIES AND CRIMINAL SANCIONS IN 
THE FIGHT AGAINST CARTELS: 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 “The challenge in attacking hard-core cartels is to penetrate their cloak of 
secrecy. To encourage a member of a cartel to confess and implicate its co-
conspirators with first-hand, direct ‘insider’ evidence about their clandestine 
meetings and communications, an enforcement agency may promise a smaller 
fine, shorter sentence, less restrictive order, or complete amnesty.”
1
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Cartels are recognised by competition authorities around the 
world as being particularly damaging to the well-being of markets and 
economies, especially in developing countries and their conduct is held to be the 
most egregious of anti-competitive practices. The objective of this paper is to 
ascertain whether preventative and deterrent measures, primarily in the form of 
leniency policies and criminal sanctions, have been effective in the fight against 
cartels or whether criminal sanctions have undermined the advancements made 
by leniency policies. These issues will be examined by considering the success 
and failures of Korea, Brazil and South Africa, with particular attention being 
paid to the latter. It is theorised that whilst leniency policies are invaluable in 
detecting and deterring cartels, criminal sanctions are so to a lesser extent due to 
competition authorities lacking ability and as a result of resource constraints, as 
well as problems of overlapping jurisdiction with public prosecutors. It is 
concluded that were these issues to be ironed out in developing countries, 
leniency policies and criminal sanctions could be used together more effectively 
in the fight against cartels. 
                                                 
1
 Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ‘Fighting Hard Core Cartels: 
Harm, Effective Sanctions and leniency Programmes’ available at www.oecd.org accessed on 30 
September 2012. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The damaging effects of hard core cartels have been extensively documented. When 
competitors agree to forego competition for collusion, consumers lose the benefits of 
lower prices and superior products or services. Clandestine cartel agreements are an 
attack on the principles of competition law and are regarded as the most egregious 
infringement of competition. 
Cartels are defined as ‘an association of manufacturers or suppliers formed to 
keep the prices high’
2
 and commonly agree on matters such as price fixing, total 
industry output, market share, allocation of customers or territories, bid rigging, the 
division of profits and so forth  They are formed with the objective of increasing 
members’ profits by reducing competition.
3
 The effects of this type of cartel conduct 
may result in a cartel member’s output being reduced, prices in the particular market 
increasing, development and innovation being stifled and new firms being prevented 
from entering the market, all of which is detrimental to consumer welfare, the 
ultimate objective of competition law.
4
   
Cartels are an increasingly international phenomenon and are recognised by 
competition authorities around the world as being a particularly damaging form of 
anti-competitive practice to the well-being of markets and economies. It is thus often 
an integral aspect of a country’s competition laws to identify and break up cartels; a 
task which is seldom straightforward given the difficulties in proving the existence of 
cartels.
5
 
South Africa enacted the Competition Act 89 of 1998
6
 (“the Act”) with the 
stated purpose to “promote and maintain competition”
7
. It is all very well enacting 
legislation to prohibit the anti-competitive practices of cartels but if cartels cannot be 
identified and uncovered, there is little possibility of eliminating them. Hence the Act 
also provides for the establishment of a Competition Commission (“the 
                                                 
2
 Little Oxford English Dictionary 9ed (2006) 96. 
3
 ‘Cartel’ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 1 June 2012 available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartel, accessed on 11 June 2013.  
4
 K Moodaliyar ‘Are Cartels Skating on Thin Ice? An Insight into the South African Corporate 
Leniency Policy’ (2008) 125 SALJ 157 at 157. 
5
 Op cit note 3. 
6
 Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
7
 Ibid, section 2. 
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Commission”) and a Competition Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) which have the 
respective powers to, inter alia, investigate and evaluate alleged contraventions of 
Chapter 2 of the Act
8
 (which sets out prohibited practices including horizontal 
restricted practises under section 4 which will be discussed in more detail below) and 
adjudicate on any conduct prohibited in terms of Chapter 2 by determining whether 
the prohibited conduct in question has occurred
9
. Although the Act grants the 
Commission extensive powers to investigate cartels,
10
 the reality of a developing 
country such as South Africa means that resources are scarce and combating cartels 
is often secondary to other pressing socio-economic issues. Thus, unless a 
complainant comes forward, the chances of identifying and proving the existence of 
a cartel tend to be fairly low.  
Whilst numerous developed countries have had great achievements in 
combating cartels, few developing countries have the resources for detecting 
domestic and international cartels and deterring anti-competitive practices. The 
consequence is that developing countries either have to rely on co-operation from 
developed countries and/or they implement leniency programs and rely on 
disclosures made in terms thereof.  
The purpose of a leniency pr gram is to uncover schemes by giving firms an 
incentive to disclose their involvement in a cartel and to hand over evidence even 
prior to an investigation being carried out or, where already under investigation, to 
leave the cartel.
11
 In return, the firm may be given immunity from prosecution or a 
reduced penalty. Such disclosures allow competition authorities to pierce the veil of 
secrecy and obtain insider information. This expedites the investigation and benefits 
both the public and the competition authorities through the saving of time, money 
and resources which are required for a lengthy investigation. Moreover, it has a 
deterrent effect on the formation and persistence of cartels as it destabilises their 
operations and instils mistrust and suspicion amongst the cartel members. 
The Commission in its endeavours to detect, stop and prevent cartel activity 
has in line with other international jurisdictions developed a leniency policy to 
facilitate the process through which firms participating in a cartel are encouraged to 
                                                 
8
 Ibid, section 21(1)(c). 
9
 Ibid, section 27(1)(c). 
10
 Ibid, chapter 5. 
11
 K Moodaliyar op cit note 4 at 158. 
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disclose information on the cartel conduct in return for immunity from prosecution.
12
 
The Commission implemented the first version of its corporate leniency policy in 
2004. 
Although leniency policies certainly play a role in deterring cartels, they are 
probably more effective in identifying cartels. The question remains as to the most 
effective way in which to deter the formation of cartels and their related conduct. As 
in South Africa, cartels are prohibited in many jurisdictions because of the 
recognised harmful effects which they have on economies and significant penalties 
or fines are usually imposed with a view to deterring cartels. However the 
effectiveness of such penalties has been weakened, inter alia, by the fact that cartels 
have become increasingly sophisticated, operating conspiratorially and in secret so as 
to avoid being detected in the first place.
13
 Even where they are exposed to large 
fines, these fines are in some instances ineffective in deterring cartels because the 
impact of the fine is outweighed by the benefits or gains which cartels derive from 
co-operative anti-competitive practices. Accordingly, there has been a trend for 
countries with competition laws to introduce criminal sanctions for anti-competitive 
behaviour.
14
  
South Africa followed suit and under the Competition Amendment Act
15
 
(‘the Amendment Act’) introduced section 73A which makes it an offence for a 
person who is a director or in a management position to cause or permit the firm to 
engage in a prohibited practice. The threat of criminal prosecution leading to a fine 
or imprisonment will certainly deter many potential cartel participants from engaging 
in anti-competitive behaviour. However, as it stands section 73A raises many 
questions as to how it is to be interpreted and to its constitutionality. It also has to be 
considered whether a criminal sanction will not serve to detract from the efficiency 
of the leniency policy by deterring individuals from coming forward for fear of 
prosecution. 
In considering the approach adopted by South Africa under its leniency 
policy and its decision to incorporate a criminal sanction into its competition law, 
                                                 
12
 Competition Commission of South Africa Corporate Leniency Policy Government Notice No 195 
of 6 February 2004 para 2.5. 
13
 K Moodaliyar op cit note 4 at 157. 
14
 R Whish Competition Law 4ed (2001) 416. 
15
 Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. 
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due regard will be given to the approach taken in other developing countries. As a 
point of departure, Korea and Brazil will provide a comparative view in respect of 
the measures taken by developing countries in relation to leniency policies and 
criminal sanctions. The successes and pitfalls of these regimes will be discussed so 
as to see what South Africa can learn from their experiences and to see how its own 
regime may be improved.  
Chapter II of this paper sketches the reason behind cartel formation and the 
effect that cartels have on developing countries. Chapter III outlines the theory of 
leniency policies. Chapter IV and V considers the success and failures of leniency 
policies and criminal sanctions as adopted by Korea and Brazil respectively. Chapter 
VI sets out South Africa’s competition legislative framework for dealing with cartels; 
it considers the success and failures of the leniency policy and criminal sanction and 
also raises a number of issues unique to South Africa. Chapter VII gives a general 
overview of the effectiveness of imposing criminal sanctions in developing countries.  
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II. THE IMPACT OF CARTELS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
It is often espoused that cartels are the most egregious form of anti-competitive 
behaviour; this is in part because the types of horizontal restrictive practices in which 
they engage allow a number of competitive firms to act like a monopolist.
16
 
Although cartels are seen from the outside as being formidable, they are generally 
inherently nervous and unstable. Their collusion is motivated by self-interest and 
consequently if their own economic situation or market circumstances change so that 
co-operation is no longer to their advantage, the desire to co-operate will disappear – 
at the heart of it cartel members remain rivals.
17
 Cartels have accordingly been 
described as ‘a product of truce rather than...a genuine alliance’
18
.  
Given cartels’ inherent instability, economists have employed game theory 
and use the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ to explain the benefit/risk analysis in forming and 
maintaining cartels.
19
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is used to illustrate that at the 
inception of the cartel it is a matter of working out the dynamics of competition – the 
effect of lowering prices, the output and price which the cartel members will charge 
to receive the optimal collective benefit, and an agreement not to adjust their price.
20
 
Essentially, the best strategy is for the firms to compete independently unless they 
are certain that the other(s) will charge the agreed price. Collusion will ensure that 
they gain collectively but the cartel members will only be willing to continue to do so 
if they are confident that the other firm(s) will adhere to the arrangement.
21
 Once the 
cartel is established, the over-riding concern will be whether it is in that firm’s self-
interest to maintain the agreed status quo.  
In many countries the operation of a cartel is illegal and firms that are found 
guilty of participation are severely fined, for example the United States makes 
provision for treble damages
22
. One has to wonder then whether the benefits of 
                                                 
16
 P Sutherland & K Kemp Competition Law of South Africa Issue 15 (2012) para 5.2. 
17
 C Harding & J Joshua Regulating Cartels in Europe: A Study of Legal Control of Corporate 
Delinquency 1ed (2003) 210. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 P Sutherland & K Kemp op cit note 16 at para 5.2. 
22
 M Levenstein & V Suslow ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: 
Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’ (2004) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 801 at 
801. 
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forming and maintaining a cartel really justify or at least outweigh the potential 
penalties. 
In a study carried out of 69 (sixty-nine) court outcomes in 11 (eleven) 
jurisdictions, it was demonstrated that 71 per cent of cartel participants were aware 
that their actions were illegal
23
 and in the vast majority of cases senior management 
were involved or turned a blind eye to what was happening beneath them.
24
 The 
belief was that the benefits outweighed the risks associated with their illegal 
behaviour - 40 per cent of the cartel participants held the pressure to be profitable 
and for their company to perform favourably to be the main reasons for 
participation.
25
 Other reasons cited for forming or joining the cartel included to build 
trust and working relationships, to co-ordinate an approach to serving customers, to 
prevent the firm being forced out of business for not joining the cartel, to 
counterbalance the dominance of certain firms in the market and thereby benefit the 
economy, to increase profits and maximise profit margins.
26
 
Of the outcomes analysed in this study 73 per cent related to domestic cartels 
and the remainder to international ones.
27
 As early as the between 1929 and 1937 
cartels were having an impact; it has been estimated that international cartels affected 
40 per cent of all world trade in the aforesaid period.
28
 Through globalisation and the 
expansion of markets international cartels have become more prevalent and have 
evolved and expanded. Although global economic integration has provided 
opportunities for developing countries to grow it has also resulted in them becoming 
more exposed to foreign sources of anti-competitive behaviour.
29
 Thus regard must 
be given to the impact cartels have on economics and competition in developing 
countries which tend to be marginalised. 
The effect of cartels on developing countries was put into perspective by a 
quantitative analysis carried out by M Levenstein and V Suslow for the period 
                                                 
2323
 Note that in 22 per cent of the cases analysed it could not be determined whether the participants 
were aware of the illegality of their actions and in 7 per cent they were unaware of the illegality. 
24
 M Berzins & F Sofo ‘Non-compliance with competition laws and offenders’ reasons for forming a 
cartel: content analysis of court outcomes in eleven jurisdictions’ (2007) 3 Competition L. Int’l 36 at 
38. 
25
 Ibid, 36. 
26
 Ibid, 39-40. 
27
 Ibid, 38. 
28
 Ibid, 36. 
29
 Y Yu The Impact of Private International Cartels on Developing Countries (unpublished Honours 
thesis, Stanford University, 2003) at 3. 
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between 1990 and 1997. Using a sample of 19 (nineteen) products they found that 
the total value of potentially cartel-affected imports to developing countries was 
$51.1 billion. This figure represented 3.7 per cent of all imports to developing 
countries and 0.79 per cent of their combined GDP (gross domestic product) in 
1997.
30
 Stated differently, the average annual amount of trade impinged on in cartel-
affected industries to developing countries in the same period was $18.5 billion.
31
 
They explained further that in 1997 foreign aid to developing countries 
amounted to $39.4 billion, thus if the prices of the imports increased on average 10 
per cent annually (10 per cent being the lowest reported increase of the samples 
used) producers from developed countries could potentially take 15 per cent of what 
their government donated in foreign aid from developing country consumers as a 
result of higher prices.
32
 
The most recognised impact that cartels have on consumers is that the price 
of the goods or services will increase, product choice may decrease and innovation 
and development is restrained. For producers there are costs and advantages 
associated with the existence of international cartels. A producer who is not part of 
the cartel may be able to sell at the cartel price whilst not being restricted by any 
quota and thereby benefit from cartel members’ output restrictions.
33
 On the other 
hand international cartels may adopt tactics so as to deny developing country 
producers access to the market. These tactics may include restricting the flow of 
information and limiting access to technology, using tariffs and anti-dumping duties 
as barriers, or even threats of retaliatory or predatory price wars, use of common 
sales or distribution agency and patent pooling.
34
 Moreover, once the cartel has 
dissolved developing countries may be compelled to become part of a joint venture 
as a result of cartel-created barriers. Whilst there may be some benefits to the joint 
venture such as sharing of technology, market expertise or access to capital, it may 
also limit a developing country’s sales and distribution to a particular market. Joint 
                                                 
30
 M Levenstein & V Suslow op cit note 22 at 816. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Y Yu op cit note 29 at 7. 
34
 M Levenstein & V Suslow op cit note 22 at 820 – 821. 
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ventures could also be used by colluding firms to incorporate developing countries 
into their cartels or to engage in an implicit co-operative pricing arrangement.
35
 
Whilst anti-competitive behaviour by cartels may impact on markets 
internationally, prosecution of cartels is generally handled by each country 
individually and in relation to the specific damage they have caused to the domestic 
market. The developed countries have strong competition authorities to prosecute 
cartels whereas few developing countries have competition authorities and even 
fewer are sufficiently competent or have the necessary resources.
36
 Developing 
countries need to take measures so that in a cost/benefit analysis the sanctions will 
have a deterrent effect and outweigh the advantages. It is suggested that too often the 
penalties handed down to cartel members serve as ‘little more than a slap on the 
wrist’
37
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Ibid, 824. 
36
 Y Yu op cit note 29 at 3. 
37
 M Berzins & F Sofo op cit note 24 at 41. 
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III. THE ESSENCE OF LENIENCY POLICIES 
 
Incorporating a leniency policy into its program of cartel enforcement has been 
recognised by many countries as having substantial benefits. Foremost is the fact that 
it uncovers conspiracies which would otherwise go undetected because of the 
secretive nature of cartels. In addition, once an applicant for leniency has disclosed 
the cartel activity it is required to cease and desist from continued involvement with 
the cartel in order to reap the benefits of leniency. Leniency policies with high 
sanctions operate as a deterrent to both cartel members who fear getting caught and 
as an incentive to co-operate with prosecutors in order to reduce or eliminate 
sanctions. 
Where an applicant reports cartel activities and implicates other members of 
the cartel it can provide competition authorities with first hand evidence which will 
not only speed up the investigation process but will also mean that the investigation 
can be carried out at a reduced cost.
38
 In turn, this will potentially increase the 
prospects of a successful prosecution. These benefits can then be translated to the 
consumer and the community which profits from the concomitant effects of 
increased competition, lower prices, better services and increased innovation and 
efficiency in the market.
39
 
The addition of a leniency program does not necessarily translate into an 
effective competition regime. Developing countries in particular tend to fall short in 
implementing leniency policies. Developing countries will usually all encounter 
similar obstacles in implementing their respective leniency policies but some 
challenges will be unique to the specific country. 
Budgetary constraints are probably the main challenge faced by competition 
authorities in developing countries. Governments have limited resources at their 
disposal and can better justify using what resources they have to deal with more 
                                                 
38
 International Competition Commission ‘Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual, Chapter 2 Drafting and 
implementing an effective leniency program’ available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc341.pdf  accessed on 2 October 
2012. 
39
 Ibid. 
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pressing socio-economic problems.
40
 A lack of resources will not only mean a 
smaller number of staff but also that they are unlikely to receive the appropriate 
training and skills development. The corollary of this is that they will not be able to 
adequately respond to queries and complaints, investigate cartels efficiently, identify 
anti-competitive practices or handle complex matters. These factors cause delays and 
incorrect decisions.
41
 Although it is reasoned that priority should be given to the 
strengthening of anti-cartel enforcement,
42
 lack of resources will make it especially 
difficult to effectively and efficiently investigate and prosecute cartels, especially 
because the larger international cartels have access to resources and the best 
economists and lawyers to assist them in defending any proceedings instituted 
against them.
43
 
A further challenged faced by these competition authorities is the absence of 
a competition culture.
44
 A consumer’s failure to understand the importance of free 
and fair competition and the potential harms resulting from a lack of consumer 
activism combined with businesses’ view that competition enforcement amounts to 
unwarranted government intervention, will make it difficult for a competition 
authority to justify its relevance. Consequently, firms and individuals are less likely 
to see the importance in applying for leniency and disclosing cartel activities.
45
 This 
is clearly seen from the early experience of competition law in Korea (as outlined 
below).  
Commonly cartel activity is detected through leniency applications. 
Alternatively cartels may be discovered through a competition authority’s own 
investigations or as a result of public announcements made by developed countries in 
the form of a press release following a dawn raid or by way of a final decision in a 
                                                 
40
 T Kunene ‘Challenges faced by new Younger Competition agencies in the Investigation of Cartels’ 
(2006) available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc704.pdf) 
accessed on 13 October 2012. 
41
 ‘Strategic priorities of competition and regulatory agencies in developing countries’ Paper 
submitted under first research cycle of CUTS Competition, Regulation and Development Research 
Forums (CDRF) available at 
http://www.circ.in/pdf/STRATEGIC%20PRIORITIES%20OF%20COMPETITION%20AND%20REG
ULATORY%20AGENCIE.pdf accessed on 17 October 2012. 
42
Ibid. 
43
 T Kunene op cit note 40. 
44
 Op cit note 41. 
45
 T Kunene op cit note 40. 
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cartel investigation.
46
 Whilst these public announcements and the information and 
evidence collected by developed countries can be useful leads for developing 
countries, it often only becomes available after investigations are finalised and even 
then it may be limited due to reasons of confidentiality and plea bargain 
settlements.
47
 Furthermore, the investigation of international cartels is time 
consuming and where a developing country has to wait for information and evidence 
to become available before conducting its own investigation too much time may 
lapse and authorities could face issues of prescription.
48
 It is suggested that in these 
types of circumstances, developed countries should assist developing countries as 
their information may be invaluable to them in investigating and prosecuting cartels 
and save on their limited resources.  
One of the problematic aspects of developing countries relying so largely on 
the voluntary co-operation of cartel members under a leniency program is that local 
branches may have little knowledge of the activities of large international cartels and 
are unlikely to have access to documents relating to such activities. As they are 
unlikely to be able to provide any meaningful information or evidence to an 
investigation, they will not succeed with a leniency application which will deter them 
from coming forward in the first place.
49
  
In addition to the general problems of enforcement that have been discussed 
above, additional challenges may arise for both applicants and competition 
authorities as a result of the processes required to be followed under a particular 
leniency policy. In this respect we shall consider the experiences of Korea, Brazil 
and in particular South Africa, and the strengths and weaknesses of their differing 
applications of leniency. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Information obtained from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ‘Cross-border 
anticompetitive practices: The challenges for developing countries and economies in transition’ 12
th
 
session, Geneva 9 – 11 July 2012. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 Ibid. 
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IV. THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 
 
a) Leniency 
 
Since the 1980s when the Korean economy began to develop at a rapid pace, the 
fight against cartels has received greater priority.  In 1981 Korea enacted the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
50
 (“MRFTA”) in its pursuit for a balanced 
development of the national economy. It strived to prevent abuse of market-
dominance by firms and excessive concentration of economic power by regulating 
undue collaborative acts and unfair trade practice, and by promoting free and fair 
competition.
51
 The implementation of many of these objectives is today still overseen 
by the Korean Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”). 
Korea adopted a leniency program in 1997. The requirements for qualifying 
under the leniency policy were set out in the enforc ment regulations. Although not 
clearly stated, it was implicit that information disclosed had to be valuable, accurate 
and complete; furthermore the applicant could not be the instigator of the cartel.
52
 An 
administrative fine and a criminal sanction could both be imposed. The sanction and 
degree of punishment were based on a firm’s responsibility and were determined at 
the discretion of the authorities.
53
 
The fact that between 1997 and 2000 there was merely one reported leniency 
application
54
 is clearly indicative of the fact that this version of the leniency policy 
had several shortcomings. The regulations as well as the requirements and processes 
to be followed were vague and unclear, the applicant had no guarantee that its 
identity would remain confidential or that it would not be criminally prosecuted, and 
the fines (of up to 5 per cent of the firm’s annual turnover) were inadequate as a 
deterrent. In fact this financial sanction was less stringent than in most other 
countries with similar such programs.
55
 As stated above, the sanctions placed on the 
member firms were at the discretion of the competition authorities and this wide 
                                                 
50
 Act No. 3320 of 1980. 
51
 Details of Enactment and Amendment to Act No. 3320 of 1980. 
52
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ‘Leniency Programmes to fight 
hard-core cartels’ 2001(3) Journal of Competition law and Policy 13. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 K Moodaliyar op cit note 4 at 167. 
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discretion was viewed as a further weakness in the policy. It created additional 
uncertainty because the lack of precedent meant that firms could not know what risk 
they faced.
56
  
Where a firm was the first to present information to the KTFC about a cartel 
which it had previously been unaware of, the firm would be granted around 75 per 
cent leniency treatment, if the investigation had already commenced the first firm 
‘through the door’ would be granted 50 per cent leniency. All other applicants would 
be granted less than 50 per cent leniency.
57
 The fact that a firm could never obtain 
more than 75 per cent leniency treatment would hardly suffice as enough of an 
incentive for firms to come forward given that the advantages gained from 
participation in the cartel would probably outweigh the benefits of partial leniency 
treatment. 
The limitations of the leniency program were further exacerbated by the fact 
that Korea had a confucian culture where co-operation amongst people was highly 
valued with the result that firms formed cartels without much sense of guilt and 
members were reluctant to betray one another.
58
  
In 2005, In Ok Son, General Counsel for the KFTC gave a presentation to 
members of the International Competition Network (‘the ICN’) whereat he discussed 
various factors which he believed would assist Korea, as a developing country, in 
clamping down on cartel activities. Two of the greatest problems which he 
highlighted were the gathering of electronic evidence and investigating international 
cartels.
59
 Close co-operation and experience sharing were emphasised as key and that 
without co-operation investigating international cartels would be almost 
impossible.
60
 His suggestions were, inter alia, the building of channels for co-
operation through bilateral and multilateral agreements, forming and strengthening 
non-official channels with access to cartel handlers at all times, joint investigations 
                                                 
56
 Ibid, 167. 
57
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with foreign competition authorities, competition policy consultations, multilateral 
discussions and workshops.
61
 
The Korean leniency policy was revised in 2000 and again in 2004/5. The 
latter version provides for a number of the abovementioned recommendations.  The 
KFTC undertook various measures such as educational programs and campaigns to 
increase public awareness and understanding as to the harm caused by cartels and to 
highlight to the public that it was being directly affected by cartel extortions.
62
 The 
KFTC also recognised the benefit in offering leniency to second and subsequent 
firms which come forward and even to firms which established the cartel. 
Accordingly, the first firm to report a cartel prior to investigations commencing now 
receives full immunity, and as of November 2007 the second firm receives a 50 
percent reduction in penalties (instead of 30 per cent as previously provided).
63
 
Offering an incentive to the second firm further persuades a firm to approach the 
competition authorities to report a cartel even where it is not certain that it will be 
‘first through the door’.  
The revised policy also includes an additional benefit for revealing another 
cartel and a ‘marker’ system to encourage quicker action.
64
 This system allows an 
applicant to assure itself of leniency by notifying the authorities of the cartel activity 
and thereby securing its place in line, until such time as it can submit all the 
necessary information and evidence for its leniency application.
65
 After 
investigations have commenced however, only the first firm to apply will qualify for 
leniency. The policy also endeavours to protect the identity of leniency applicants.
66
 
The sanction on a member firm has been increased from 5 per cent to 10 per cent of 
its annual turnover which is more in keeping with fines imposed in other countries
67
 
and in repeat offences the administrative penalty can be increased up to 50 per cent.
68
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The KFTC has also incorporated a ‘whistleblower’ aspect to the leniency 
program to encourage individuals to come forward and disclose cartel conduct. The 
informant is rewarded with a portion of the penalty charged on the firm.
69
 Initially 
the informant reward program was not very successful because informants were wary 
about the negative perception resulting from reporting (which would seemingly stem 
from the culture of cooperation amongst Korean people), they feared retaliation if 
their identity was not kept confidential and the incentive to make these types of 
disclosures was too small to justify the risks.
70
  Consequently, the KFTC usually only 
received about one lead per year. In 2005 a new informant reward program was 
introduced which provided for an increased reward for information about cartels and 
in terms whereof the reward would be determined with reference to the seriousness 
of the violation and the quality of evidence provided.
71
 An enforcement decree was 
also issued in terms of the MRFTA which guaranteed the protection of 
confidentiality. Furthermore, additional measures were introduced to protect the 
informant’s identity with the ensuing result that informants are now more willing to 
disclose information about cartels.
72
 
The leniency program has been refined and is more transparent and 
predictable. The benefits thereof can be seen by the fact that 7 (seven) leniency 
applications were received between 1999 and 2004 but after the changes were 
effected in 2005, 23 (twenty three) cases were treated with leniency between 2005 
and 2007, as illustrated in the table below:
 73
 
  
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Cases 1 1 0 2 1 2 7 7 9 
Fines (USD 
Million 0.314 0.043 0 1.2 3.4 0 173.6 54.9 221.3 
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In the first 6 (six) months of 2008 alone, 30 (thirty) leniency applications 
were filed.
74
  
The KFTC has improved the effectiveness of its leniency program by 
implementing many of the good practices recommended by the ICN such as 
encouraging leniency applications through education and awareness campaigns, 
guaranteeing the protection of identities and confidentiality, introducing a marker 
system, offering leniency to the second firm ‘through the door’ and increasing the 
administrative penalty to ensure that any benefit derived from cartelisation would be 
outweighed by such fine.
75
  
Although the KFTC must be commended for the measures it has 
implemented, there are still a number of factors which should be considered to 
further improve the effectiveness of the leniency program. In particular it is 
submitted that the KFTC should encourage applicants to apply for leniency in other 
jurisdictions where such cartel conduct has occurred. This would open the lines for 
increased co-operation and networking between Korea and other countries and allow 
for the exchange of information and evidence.  
 
b) Criminal Sanctions 
 
Although criminal sanctions are available under Korean competition law, including a 
maximum 3 (three) year imprisonment, they are rarely applied. Criminal sanctions 
have not been strongly enforced for various reasons, some of which are specific to 
Korea and its cultural and economic views but for the most part these reasons stem 
from the same types of difficulties faced by other developing countries in 
competition law enforcement. 
The KFTC is an administrative body under the influences of political 
leadership. Thus in the 1980s and 1990s Korean competition law was intended to 
answer to problems such as price increases, staggered economic development, 
monopolies and oligopolies in the market. In particular, it focused on countering the 
effects of market concentration which had arisen as a result of conglomerates and 
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regulating unfair practices between firms.
76
 Preventing and deterring cartel activity 
was therefore not a priority. This attitude has gradually changed as new presidents 
have been elected and awareness has increased as to the impact of such activities on 
the economy.
77
 
As an administrative body, the KFTC is also subject to budgetary constraints. 
Imposing an administrative penalty is an appealing choice as a portion of the penalty 
imposed goes to the KFTC; the same does not apply where a fine is imposed in 
respect of a criminal offence.
78
 Furthermore, an administrative sanction is more time 
efficient than the judicial process of running a criminal trial. It is thus not surprising 
that administrative penalties and cease and desist orders take preference over 
criminal sanctions
79
 and that less than 5 per cent of all such cases have been referred 
to the public prosecutor’s office for criminal prosecution.
80
 
Where a matter does follow the judicial process, the judges are lax in 
punishment and prefer to impose an administrative penalty rather than a prison 
sentence. Since 2000 prison sentences have been imposed in merely 6 (six) cases but 
in not one matter did anyone actually spend any time in jail due to these sentences 
being suspended or individuals being given probation.
81
 The reluctance in imposing 
criminal sanctions seems to stem partly from the fact that public prosecutors and 
judges fail to recognise the inherent criminality of cartels.
82
 Furthermore, the lower 
courts’ unwillingness to impose heavy white-collar sentences and their lack of ease 
and familiarity with economic issues means there is little judicial precedence for 
handling what are often complex matters and this reinforces their decision not to 
impose criminal sanctions.
83
 It is hoped that as competition issues are given more 
priority and come under public scrutiny more regularly, the subject will become 
more familiar to judges and prosecutors and judicial capacity to deal with these 
issues will improve. International co-operation and multilateral discussions and 
workshops with developed countries to train and skill judges and prosecutors in 
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competition law would go a long way to improving the Korean judicial system’s 
ability to handle competition law issues, especially those relating to the criminal 
conduct of cartel members. 
Managing directors or executives can be held criminally responsible for 
violations by their firms. At present, a recommendation by the KFTC is required to 
initiate prosecutions. From 1981 to 2010 the KFTC handled a total of 56 527 (fifty 
six thousand five hundred and twenty seven) cases of which 0.9 per cent were 
referred to the Prosecutor’s Office. However, many of these involved relatively 
minor offences which would not usually be referred. If the scope was limited to 
illegal cartel cases, the referral rate increases to 11 per cent (ie 44 out 504 cases).
84
 
The KFTC’s exclusive referral power has been criticised and a call has been made 
for it to be limited so that criminal cases can be pursued through other avenues. This 
would allow victims of cartel activities to file complaints directly with the 
Prosecutor’s Office. The Minister of Justice has proposed that its prosecutors be 
given the power to initiate competition cases of their own accord.
85
 The KFTC, on 
the other hand, is wary that without its economic input, competition could be 
impaired if prosecutors apply a purely criminal law perspective.
86
 In fact, it has a 
relatively high percentage of criminal referrals as compared with other member 
countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘the 
OECD’) and if the Prosecutor’s Office were to start initiating criminal proceedings 
against leniency applicants, it would detract from the leniency program.
87
  
Continued lack of public awareness as to the fact that cartel activity is a 
criminal offence which causes harm to the consumer, is another contributing factor to 
the lack of enforcement of criminal sanctions. In order to enforce criminal penalties 
for violations of competition law, the authorities require the public’s backing as well 
as institutional support and expert aid.
88
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It has been suggested that an additional incentive of a reduced criminal 
penalty under the leniency program should also be offered.
89
 The advantage of 
adopting such an approach is that cartel members may be more willing to come 
forward where they can be certain that the firm as well as its directors will be shown 
leniency and consequently there will be an increase in cartel detection. One has to 
wonder though whether this would serve any real purpose as the threat of criminal 
sanction does not seem to be taken too seriously and until the system is improved and 
criminal sanctions are enforced it is unlikely to have any real meaningful impact on 
the prevention and detection of cartels. 
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V. THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
a) Leniency  
 
Brazilian Competition Law was introduced in 1994 but during the early stages the 
emphasis was on developing and establishing a merger review process.
90
 It was only 
later that the enforcement of cartels became a priority.  
Although the Brazilian cartel enforcement regime is still in its early stages, it 
is regarded by many as being revolutionary in light of the lengths it has gone to in 
implementing and increasing dawn raids, in respect of it its investigation 
proceedings, in raising the amount of fines, the co-operative programs it has with 
international antitrust agencies and criminal authorities such as Canada, the United 
States, Chile, Russia and the European Union, the swift development of its leniency 
program and its measures in pursuing criminal prosecutions. As a result Brazil is 
considered to be one of the leading countries in cracking down on cartels, even 
amongst developed countries.
91
 Its commitment to curbing hardcore cartels is further 
evidenced by the fact that the 8
th
 October has been declared as Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement Day in Brazil.
92
   In fact, the 2008 Rating Enforcement Report released 
by the Global Competition Review stated that Brazil has the fastest growing cartel 
enforcers in the world.
93
 
Article 20 of Federal Law No 8 884/1994 in Brazil prohibits cartel and 
antitrust violations and provides that any practice that has as its object or effect the 
restraint of competition will be considered anti-competitive.
94
 The penalties for an 
antitrust violation could be set between 1 per cent and 30 per cent of a firm’s pre-tax 
turnover in the year preceding the initiation of investigations and would not be lower 
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than the competition advantage gained from the infringement.
95
 Additional penalties 
which may be imposed on the firm include a limitation on participating in public 
bids, a restriction on receiving tax benefits or receiving public financing for up to 
five years and the publication of any adverse decisions in a major newspaper at the 
firm’s expense.
96
 Directors of firms whose involvement in such activities was proved 
could be fined 10 per cent to 50per cent of the fine applied to the firm. The problem 
with these administrative penalties was that there was no fixed formula for 
determining same, with the result that there was a lack of certainty and consistency 
when sanctions were imposed.
 97
 
The three agencies that up until 2012 were primarily concerned with cartel 
enforcement in Brazil were the Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of 
Justice (the “SDE”) which was the chief investigative body in dealing with anti-
competitive practices and also issued non-binding rulings in respect of mergers, the 
Secretariat for Economic Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance (the “SEAE”) which 
issued non-binding rulings in respect of mergers and the Brazilian competition 
authority (Administrative Council for Economic Defence) (“CADE”) which was an 
administrative tribunal that provided final rulings in anti-competitive and merger 
cases after reviewing the SDE and SEAE’s  opinions.
98
 
Brazil adopted a leniency program in 2000 and since its implementation 
Brazil has taken fairly aggressive measures in detecting cartels, such as dawn raids, 
wiretapping, co-operative crackdown programs with other countries and the use of 
quantitative and economic analytical techniques.
99
 The effectiveness of this program 
can be seen by looking at the number of leniency agreements that have been signed 
since its inception. Between 2003 (when the first agreement was signed) and 2006 
only three agreements were signed, however in the period between 2007 and 2011, 
twenty agreements were signed.
100
 What is interesting to note is that most of these 
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agreements relate to international cartels
101
 which shows the benefits of increased 
recognition by and co-operation with foreign antitrust authorities. 
In terms of the leniency program only the firm ‘first through the door’ would 
benefit. It must not have instigated the anti-competitive conduct, it must confess its 
involvement, cease its participation in such activity and co-operate fully with the 
investigation.
102
 The SDE would however only enter into a leniency agreement with 
a firm if it could provide sufficient information for the SDE to conduct investigations 
and convict the remaining cartel members.
103
  
Where the SDE entered into a leniency agreement, the applicant could 
potentially receive a reduction of one to two thirds of the financial penalty where the 
SDE was already aware of the cartel activity and would receive full immunity where 
the SDE had no prior knowledge.
104
 In addition, the SDE would make efforts to 
ensure that the applicant was not subjected to criminal prosecutions for its 
involvement.
105
 
With a view to encouraging leniency applications, the marker system was 
introduced in Brazil. Applicants could thus secure their place in line in terms of a 
leniency application whilst still having time to collect the necessary information and 
evidence (provided that this was done within 30 (thirty) days).
106
 
Although, it was the SDE that entered into the leniency agreement with an 
applicant, the sanction imposed had to be confirmed by the CADE. Conclusion of the 
agreement was not subject to CADE’s approval per se, rather when reviewing the 
case CADE had to consider whether there had been compliance with the agreement, 
and if it had been dishonoured, the benefits would be forfeited.
107
  
Brazil’s achievements with its leniency program are further evidenced by the 
fact that international cartels are applying for leniency under Brazil’s leniency 
program which has in turn further improved co-operation with foreign anti-trust 
agencies.
108
 In 2009, Brazil joined the United States and the European Commission 
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in its first joint dawn raid to collect evidence on an international cartel.
109
 Brazil’s 
cartel-enforcement regime is clearly being seen as a force to be reckoned with and 
instead of receiving assistance in the enforcement of anti-competitive practices it is 
now in a position to provide assistance to other developing countries. 
With the increasing number of successful detections and prosecutions of 
cartels, as well as the fact that only the first applicant could obtain immunity, the 
Brazilian authorities were pressed to allow for a sort of ‘plea bargaining’.
110
 The idea 
is that firms or individuals can reach settlement with the authorities whereby they 
confess to their involvement, agree to desist from such activities and pay a settlement 
fine and the investigation is then dismissed. The benefit to the firm is clear, but there 
is also a benefit to the authorities in that it will have the co-operation of the firm 
going forwards, the anti-competitive practice will cease and less time and resources 
will be spent on an investigation.
111
  
Whilst a settlement agreement seems to be a viable option that other 
developing countries should consider there have also been difficulties with the 
concept. For example, it was initially questioned whether such a settlement 
agreement concluded by SDE was legitimate as only CADE had the power to do so 
in terms of the law.
112
 This position was clarified by CADE which stated that it had 
the exclusive power to enter settlement agreements but that SDE could make 
suggestions and provide opinions.
113
 It was also unclear whether such an agreement 
required an acknowledgment by the firm of the unlawfulness of the conduct in 
question. Accordingly, CADE issued a regulation which provided that such an 
acknowledgement was required where the investigation was initiated in terms of a 
leniency agreement – this requirement was aimed at preventing settlements from 
jeopardising Brazil’s leniency policy.
114
 If entering into a settlement were less 
burdensome than applying for leniency, there would be no incentive to do so and 
preserving the leniency policy is crucial for a sound anti-cartel enforcement program. 
A further issue which required clarification was the calculation of the amount to be 
paid in settlement. As there was no formula for calculating administrative fines, it 
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was difficult to determine what would be a reasonable amount for purposes of 
settlement.
115
 
The strides which Brazil has made in cartel enforcement illustrate what can 
be achieved in a developing country if the right measures are implemented 
effectively; other developing countries would do well to consider some of these 
measures. 
 
b) Criminal Sanctions 
 
Brazil’s good reputation is not only as a result of its leniency program, it also has one 
of the most active and successful programs for the criminal prosecution of cartels to 
date. According to Federal Law No. 8, 137/1990 criminal penalties could be imposed 
on individuals for cartel violations. Criminal investigations and proceedings were 
held to be independent of the administrative proceedings in relation to cartel 
enforcement although they could be run in joint or related proceedings. The criminal 
penalty for cartel enforcement was imprisonment of two to five years or a fine.
116
 Up 
until 2007 no jail sentences were imposed, however between 2007 and 2010, twenty-
one jail sentences were handed down
117
and by July 2012 more than 250 (two 
hundred and fifty)_executives had faced criminal actions for cartelisation and 34 
(thirty four) had received jail sentences.
118
 
Some of the SDE’s most visible results can be seen from its partnership 
agreements with the Public Prosecutions Office. These co-operation agreements have 
been beneficial because whilst the Brazilian government is willing to invest 
resources in cartel enforcement it does not have access to the same extent of 
resources that the public prosecutors do.
119
 However, the public prosecutors have 
their hands full with non-competition criminal and civil matters and thus their 
readiness to enforce competition law largely depends on the relationship which SDE 
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maintained with them.
120
 Although there is an increased scope for criminal cartel 
enforcement by virtue of the fact that a prosecutor can initiate investigations 
independently of the SDE and without specialised antitrust authority to assist with 
investigations, this could possibly lead to differing outcomes or inappropriate 
sanctions.
121
 
In October 2009, the Anti-Cartel Enforcement National Strategy (“ENACC”) 
was created to support the decentralisation of the fight against cartels throughout 
Brazil through the Public Prosecutor’s Office. It is aimed at improving the skills and 
expertise of public prosecutors in dealing with cartel cases and deterring cartels more 
effectively through increased conviction rates and by imposing more severe 
penalties.
122
 ENACC has also had various spin-off benefits. It has strengthened the 
independence of the public prosecutors thereby making it easier for them to fight 
cartel members who have strong links to people with political and economic 
influence.
123
 Public prosecutors also have experience in combating and prosecuting 
people involved in corruption and other white collar crimes which are similar in 
procedural and discovery aspects to cartels.
124
 
Recently the SDE investigated foreign individuals in the course of its 
administrative proceedings and there is the likelihood that criminal authorities will 
follow suit.
125
 As international co-operation becomes more prevalent there is the 
concern that foreign citizens living or working in Brazil will be extradited where 
criminal sanctions are imposed abroad on international cartels but that the same will 
not apply where the individual is a Brazilian citizen.
126
 In fact there have already 
been instances where, in terms of criminal settlements executed in Brazil, foreign 
executives have to report to Brazilian embassies on a regular basis as part of their 
obligations. In addition, Brazilian authorities are also considering the idea of making 
use of Interpol’s Red Notice System to ensure that individuals abroad who are 
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implicated in cartel activity which has an effect in Brazil will face the imposed 
sanctions.
127
 
Whilst it is evident that Brazil has had significant achievements stemming 
from its enforcement of cartel activity, largely due to the successes of the leniency 
program and the co-operation agreements with public prosecutors and foreign anti-
trust agencies, these achievements will only be sustainable with continued access to 
appropriate and adequate resources.
128
 The challenges which Brazil faces in this 
regard include a shortage of staff that are equipped to deal with such matters, the 
strict legal demands of administrative proceedings resulting in substantial costs, the 
fact that cartel matters tend to involve complex new legal issues which have not yet 
been addressed or decided on and that parties are willing to challenge every court 
decision until all appeal avenues have been exhausted causing further delays and 
increased costs.
129
  The latter of these problems will continue until such time as the 
highest courts hand down decisions or give further guidance in these matters. 
 
c) New Measures Adopted 
 
A new Brazilian Competition Act, law 12.529/2011, came into effect on 29 
May 2012 and has made various changes to the rules on investigating 
anticompetitive behaviou . The most relevant changes in respect of cartels are briefly 
set out below. 
The three antitrust enforcement agencies SDE, SEAE and CADE have been 
unified into a single agency, the new CADE. This institutional unification is 
expected to enhance efficiency and eliminate the overlap of functions.
130
 In addition 
200 permanent staff positions have been created within CADE as a step to countering 
the shortages of staff and untrained personnel.
131
 
Notably, one of the reliefs introduced by the new legislation is the reduction 
of corporate fines. Fines will now be based on the gross sales in the relevant market 
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under investigation in the fiscal year preceding the commencement of proceedings. 
Fines will range from 0.1 per cent to 20 per cent of the firm’s income from that line 
of business.
132
 Although it may seem counter-productive to reduce the fines, the new 
standard will allow CADE to better calculate fines and reduce some of the 
uncertainty linked to the imposition of fines. Directors of such firms may be 
subjected to fines ranging from 1 per cent to 20 per cent of the fine imposed on the 
firm.
133
 Although the maximum term of imprisonment remains at two to five years, 
offenders will now subjected to both fines and imprisonment.
134
 Moreover, the new 
law has provided for other alternative penalties for individuals including barring the 
person from trading in his own name or as a representative of a legal entity for up to 
5 (five) years.
135
 
In addition, new rules have been established in respect of the leniency 
program. It has done away with the rule that leniency will not be available to the 
instigators or leaders of a cartel and although leniency is still restricted to the first 
firm ‘first through the door’, it is no longer restricted to the first individual provided 
that subsequent applicants comply with all the requirements.
136
 Criminal immunity 
that is available under a leniency application has been extended and shall apply to 
co-related crimes such as fraud in public procurement.
137
 These new incentives for 
whistle-blowers are likely to increase the number of leniency agreements concluded 
in the future. 
The new legislation is considered to be an improvement on the previous law 
which will boost antitrust enforcement in Brazil. CADE has been structured to work 
more efficiently and although fines have been reduced it is reasoned that the 
legislation provides greater clarity, more leniency agreements will be signed and 
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more individuals will receive jail sentences for anticompetitive practices with the 
concomitant result that detection and prevention of cartels is likely to increase. 
On 14 December 2012, CADE proposed a new regulation to improve settlement 
procedures for companies involved in cartel activities but which fail to qualify for 
amnesty. The objective is to make self-reporting and co-operation with the 
government more attractive thereby improving transparency and predictability and 
potentially reducing the time it takes for CADE to investigate cartels.
138
 
In terms of the aforementioned regulation, a second applicant for leniency will 
receive a reduced fine of between 30 per cent and 50 per cent. The third applicant’s 
fine will be reduced between 25 per cent and 40 per cent and any subsequent 
applicant who applies prior to the close of the investigation will receive a reduced 
fine of up to 25 per cent. If the investigation has already been completed and the 
matter is pending before the Tribunal, an applicant that comes forward at that stage 
will be entitled to 15 per cent off the estimated fine. The actual reduction will be 
determined by CADE based on the extent of the applicant’s co-operation and the 
extent to which it assisted CADE’s case.
139
 This regulation will increase the 
incentive for a company under investigation to settle and to anticipate the value of its 
co-operation. 
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VI. THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
 
a) The Legislative Framework 
 
The Chapter 2 of the Act deals with two types of restrictive practices, namely vertical 
and horizontal restrictive practices. Vertical relationships are those between a firm, 
its suppliers, its customers or both
140
 and where the parties provide complementary 
products or services. In other words, vertical restrictions operate between firms or 
individuals at different levels on the distribution chain.
141
 Co-operation is usually 
necessary for the relationship to be efficient with the result that it is less likely to 
reduce competition.
142
 Horizontal relationships, on the other hand, are those between 
competitors
143
 who produce substitute products or services.
144
 It is necessary that 
firms which produce or offer the same or similar goods or services compete and 
hence where there is co-operation between them it is inherently suspicious.
145
 
Section 4(1) of the Act is of particular relevance as cartel activities fall within 
the scope of restricted horizontal practices. Section 4(1) provides as follows: 
 
‘4. Restrictive horizontal practices prohibited 
1. An agreement between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by an 
association of firms, is prohibited if- 
a) it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and it has the effect of 
substantially  preventing or lessening competition in a market, unless a party to 
the agreement, concerted practice, or decision can prove that any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive, gain resulting from it outweighs that effect; 
or 
b) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices: 
i. directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading 
condition;  
                                                 
140
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ii. dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific 
types of goods or services; or 
iii. collusive tendering.’ 
 
It is apparent from the above that some practices are prohibited either by 
virtue of their very nature or because of the relationship between the parties.  
In terms of section 4(1)(a) an agreement, concerted practice or a decision will 
be prohibited where it has an anti-competitive effect, subject to the so-called ‘rule of 
reason’ justification (ie it will be prohibited unless it has any technological, 
efficiency or pro-competitive gain that outweighs the effect).
146
  
The section 1(1) definition of an agreement includes ‘a co tract, arrangement 
or understanding, whether or not legally enforceable’. This definition takes 
cognisance of the fact that cartel agreements are generally not legally enforceable, let 
alone reduced to writing.
147
 Obviously, cartels will attempt to obscure their activities 
and accordingly it may not be possible for the competition authorities to uncover 
documentary proof of agreements or decisions. The inclusion of concerted practice 
thus allows the authorities to take action where, objectively, the activity appears to be 
the intentional result of a co-operative effort.
148
 However, the competition authorities 
must be mindful of not taking action in cases of parallel conduct which occurs where 
one firm sets the standard, for example, it raises prices and others follow suit – 
competition law is not aimed at prohibiting innocent conduct.
149
  
Firms often come together to form an association to protect their mutual 
interests and these associations can have pro-competitive effects. Problems arise 
though when the association imposes its decisions on its members who consider 
themselves bound to comply therewith.
150
 Although the decision may only amount to 
a recommendation and not be legally binding, insofar as the members are inclined to 
implement the decision, it is likely that it will fall within the meaning of a 
decision.
151
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It would appear from the structure of the Act that section 4(1)(a) is the 
primary prohibition
152
 but given how widely it has been phrased it is realised that it is 
actually secondary to section 4(1)(b) and functions as a catch-all provision for cartel-
type activities.  
Section 4(1)(b) imposes a ‘per se’ prohibition on certain types of conduct. It 
is irrelevant whether the conduct results in anti-competitive effects or can be 
justified.
153
 The per se prohibitions cover most restricted horizontal practices and are 
primarily aimed at deterring and eliminating cartel activity. Accordingly, the ensuing 
discussions on cartels in South Africa, will focus on anti-competitive behaviour in 
terms of section 4(1)(b). 
Section 4(1)(b)(i) prohibits price fixing which is viewed as the most 
intolerable anti-competitive practice and often arises from the need to counter market 
instability or prevent competing companies from failing. It usually requires 
implementation by the majority of the competing firms in order to be effective and 
applies to the setting of minimum or maximum prices.
154
 It has been held that 
conduct should only be regarded as price fixing where there is a clear link between 
the determination of the prices and co-operation of the firms. The reference to 
indirect price fixing is aimed at preventing prices being controlled through conduct 
such as restricting output, suppl  and production quantities; although it may cause 
some uncertainty,
155
 the distinction between direct and indirect price fixing is largely 
immaterial as both are prohibited
156
.  
The section 4(1)(b)(ii) prohibition on allocating markets includes allocating 
customers or suppliers, dividing territories, or allocating particular types of products 
where there is some differentiation. By allocating markets firms can ensure the 
absence of other competitors and charge higher prices. It may also be easier to obtain 
market power through market allocation as it is easier to identify cheating by other 
cartel members in these situations than in cases of price fixing.
157
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Section 4(1)(b)(iii) prohibits collusive tendering which occurs where 
tenderers decide amongst themselves which of them should submit the lowest and 
therefore winning bid. This may be in respect of a government or private tender for 
goods or services. In doing so, cartel members ensure that they each obtain a share of 
the market and that prices remain unrealistically high.
158
 In essence it is a way of 
allocating markets and fixing prices.  
It has been held to be irrelevant whether conduct falling under section 4(1)(b) 
results in anti-competitive effects or can be justified.
159
 These types of agreements or 
practices are viewed as so egregious and without any evident benefit that they are 
presumed illegal and unreasonable without the need for any extensive inquiry into 
the harm caused or the reason behind them.
160
 The incorporation of a per se 
prohibition makes economic sense as it eliminates the need for prolonged and 
complex investigations into whether conduct was unreasonable.
161
 However, the case 
of ANSAC & Another v Competition Commission of South Africa & Others
162
 has 
raised some complexities in respect of the per se prohibition.  
ANSAC is a corporation of 5 (five) soda ash producers in the United States 
who export the product. In the United States a corporation such ANSAC would be 
illegal however they were granted an exemption which allowed them to fix soda ash 
prices when exporting the product. Botash (the Second Respondent in the matter) 
filed a complaint alleging that ANSAC was, inter alia, fixing prices and dividing 
markets in contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) and (ii). One of the pertinent issues 
was whether ANSAC’s agreement constituted price fixing as prohibited by the 
Act.
163
 Whilst the Supreme Court of Appeal (‘the SCA’) upheld the view that section 
4(1)(b) was distinct from subsection (a) in that it did not allow for a rule of reason 
approach or an efficacy defence
164
, it espoused the view that not all agreements by 
firms which set a uniform price have a chilling effect on competition and therefore 
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introduced the American concept of ‘characterising’ to determine whether the 
conduct in question constituted price fixing
165
. 
A joint venture was the example given by the SCA of an arrangement where 
uniform prices may be set but which has a legitimate purpose.
166
 Joint ventures are 
established for efficacy reasons such as to allow firms to produce or supply products 
at a lower cost or to enable them to distribute a product which they could not do 
individually; however it is submitted that even with this aim it may be that the joint 
venture nevertheless lessens competition between the partners.
167
 In setting out this 
example it has been suggested that the SCA was alluding to the distinction between a 
naked restraint which has the expected effect of increasing prices and decreasing 
output and an ancillary restraint which has the likely effect of lowering prices and 
increasing outputs.
168
 The former is deemed per se illegal whereas the latter requires 
a further inquiry under the rule of reason to determine whether the price fixing is 
reasonable.
169
 In this context characterisation also makes economic sense.
170
  
It would appear that the formulation of section 4(1)(b) does not bar 
characterisation of cartel-type conduct provided that the approach adopted does not 
blur the line between per se and rule of reason.
171
 The question, of course, is what is 
the appropriate method of characterisation? Various proposals have been made as to 
methods of characterisation, for example the application of decision theoretic 
principles which it is argued, would allow the court sufficient discretion to limit 
information gathering and processing so as to preserve the robustness of the per se 
norm in deterring cartel activities.
172
An alternative suggestion has been that parties 
who contend that they are setting uniform prices for legitimate purposes should seek 
an exemption from the Act from the Commission.
173
 
As a result of this decision by the SCA, guidance and clarification needs to be 
given on how to approach the application of section 4(1)(b). It has lead to ambiguity 
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as to what is required to prove a restricted horizontal practice under section 4(1)(b) 
and how to go about characterising conduct. The matter has been referred back to the 
Tribunal for determination but until such time as these uncertainties have been 
cleared it seems likely that it will impede on the measures taken to combat cartels 
and their anti-competitive behaviour. 
 
b) Leniency 
 
It is trite that where competitors in the same market collude to set prices or terms of 
trade, divide or allocate markets, fix tenders or engage in other similar conduct, they 
are the most egregious and often the most difficult types of anti-competitive practices 
to detect, prove and to put an end to.
174
 These difficulties arise partly because 
successful cartels are committed to keeping their agreements and decisions secret. 
Therefore, in a number of jurisdictions, competition authorities have responded to 
cartel conduct by introducing policies that offer cartel members some level of 
immunity or leniency where they break ranks and disclose the existence and nature 
of the cartel and provide the authorities with evidence of the prohibited conduct so 
that they can conduct investigations and where appropriate bring the cartel 
participants before the appropriate court.
175
  
The Commission which was established under the Act to, inter alia, 
investigate, control and evaluate restrictive practices,
176
 has, in line with other 
jurisdictions, developed a corporate leniency policy in terms whereof a self-
confessing cartel member who discloses information about the cartel to the 
Commission may in return be granted immunity from prosecution or a reduction in 
any administrative penalty imposed where it does not qualify for immunity.
177
 The 
primary purpose of the policy is to prevent cartels from engaging in cartel-related 
activities which are per se prohibited in terms of section 4(1)(b) of the Act. However, 
having regard to the ordinary meaning of ‘cartel’ and the justifications for the policy 
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it seems possible that other horizontal anti-competitive behaviour under section 
4(1)(a) could also fall within its ambit.
178
 
The Commission published the first version of its Corporate Leniency Policy in 
terms of Notice 195 of 2004 (‘the 2004 CLP’). The 2004 CLP set out the procedure 
to grant immunity to the cartel participant ‘first to the door’
179
 and a successful 
applicant was thereby able to avoid prosecution under the Act as well as escape the 
imposition of any administrative penalty.  
However, the 2004 CLP did not enjoy much success – by 2007 the 
Commission had only received 14 applications for leniency.
180
 A review of the 2004 
CLP highlighted, inter alia, the following concerns:- 
 It was purely aimed as a guideline and was not binding on the competition 
authorities; 
 An applicant was not guaranteed immunity as the Commission  retained a 
discretion in this regard even where the applicant had fully complied with all 
conditions and requirements under the 2004 CLP; 
 Applicants were obliged to make written, and not oral, applications for 
leniency; 
 Immunity would not be granted where the applicant had been the instigator or 
leader of the cartel; 
 A marker-type system was required so that a firm could reserve its place in 
line whilst collating the necessary evidence in support of its application; 
 It was not clear who the contact person at the Commission was for purposes 
of submitting a leniency application or other queries.
181
 
In order to address the above concerns the Commission amended the 2004 
CLP and on 23 May 2008, the revised Corporate Leniency Policy was published 
under Government Notice No. 628 of 2008 (‘the CLP’). The CLP applies to cartels 
which operate within and outside of South Africa, provided that the activity has an 
effect in South Africa.
182
 The Commission’s stated purpose of the CLP is ‘to 
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facilitate the process through which firms participating in cartels are encouraged to 
disclose information on the cartel conduct in return for immunity from 
prosecution’
183
. It states further that it adopted the CLP as part of its endeavours to 
detect, stop and prevent cartel behaviour.
184
 
 
i) The CLP Process 
 
The CLP sets out an extensive procedure to be followed in applying for immunity. 
However, it states that the Commission may exercise some flexibility where 
necessary to achieve the desired outcome. For instance, the Commission need not in 
each instance have a formal meeting with the applicant but may choose to 
communicate in some other manner.
185
 
The application must be made in writing to the Commission and must contain 
sufficient information for the Commission to identify the cartel conduct in question 
and to ascertain whether an application for immunity has already been made in 
respect of that cartel.
186
 The Commission will within 5 (five) days or a reasonable 
period advise the applicant whether an application has already been made and if not, 
it must make an arrangement for the first meeting to be held between it and the 
applicant.
187
 The purpose of this first meeting is to determine whether the applicant’s 
case qualifies for immunity. At this stage the applicant is required to disclose its 
identity and give the Commission sight of the relevant information, evidence and 
documents. Within 5 (five) days of the meeting, the Commission must inform the 
applicant whether it meets the conditions and requirements for immunity;
188
 if it does 
not, it will of course receive no immunity.
189
 
Only a firm which is ‘first to the door’ in disclosing cartel activity may be 
granted immunity under the CLP.
190
 Where other firms wish to apply for leniency the 
Commission may consider other possibilities such as recommending to the Tribunal 
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that the firm be subjected to a lesser penalty such as a reduced administrative fine, or 
that it sign a settlement agreement or consent order.
191
 An admission by a second 
firm and the information which it provides to corroborate what has been discovered 
may be particularly pertinent and valuable in cases where there is little other 
documentary evidence available. The Commission is generally more inclined to grant 
leniency rather than deny it to parties who co-operate especially where they can 
provide substantial new and relevant information, going even beyond what the 
original applicant provided. This lenient type of attitude was adopted towards Tiger 
Consumer Brands Ltd in the Competition Commission v Tiger Consumer Brands 
Ltd
192
 case, where the penalty imposed was mitigated by the firm’s efforts to conduct 
internal investigations to uncover conduct within their business in respect of which it 
furnished the Commission with an investigation report and its co-operation with the 
Commission.
193
  
A leniency application may be brought by a firm - this includes a natural or 
juristic person, trust or partnership. However the person bringing the application 
must be authorised to act for the firm. Where such a person is not authorised it will 
not count as an application for leniency but will be seen as whistle blowing.
194
  
Notwithstanding that the CLP details where it is applicable, where it does not 
apply, that immunity will be granted only if all conditions and requirements are 
complied with and that the policy is aimed at certain circumstances; it is not entirely 
certain whether all of these provisions must be strictly adhered to in order for an 
applicant to successfully acquire immunity or whether they are flexible guidelines to 
be applied on a case by case basis.
195
 
The idea is that a firm should approach the Commission of its own accord where 
it is involved or implicated in cartel activity, rather than waiting for the Commission 
to uncover it.
196
 As the CLP is aimed at the detection and investigation of cartels the 
CLP envisages that such activity should be unknown to the Commission prior to 
disclosure. In essence, it is aimed at cartel activity:- 
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a) Which the Commission is not aware of; or  
b) Which the Commission is aware of but in respect of which it has inadequate 
information and no investigation has yet been initiated; or 
c) In respect of pending investigations or those already initiated by the 
Commission but which the Commission is of the view that it has insufficient 
evidence to prosecute the firms involved in the cartel activity.
197
 
Where a firm is not sure whether the CLP would apply to a particular conduct 
it may approach the Commission on a hypothetical basis for a non-binding opinion to 
get clarification. This may be done telephonically or in writing.
198
 If the firm reveals 
its identity at this stage it will not be protected as immunity under the CLP has not 
yet been granted,
199
 thus a firm would probably choose to remain anonymous at this 
point.  
Information submitted by an applicant during the process is treated with the 
utmost confidentiality and the disclosure of any information prior to the grant of 
leniency is only be made with the applicant’s consent, provided that such consent is 
not unreasonably withheld.
200
  
It is apparent that the Commission does not have discretion to refuse leniency 
on the grounds that it could obtain the necessary information and evidence on its own 
accord.
201
 In addition, immunity is not conditional on the proceedings against the 
other cartel members being successful, provided that the unsuccessful outcome is not 
as a consequence of the applicant’s failure to co-operate.
202
  
Once it has been decided that the applicant qualifies for immunity, a second 
meeting will be arranged. The reason for the second meeting is for the applicant to 
furnish the Commission with further information, evidence and documents and for 
the Commission to grant conditional immunity.
203
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The Commission usually grants conditional immunity to the applicant at this 
initial stage of the application so as to foster a good atmosphere and trust between 
itself and the applicant pending finalisation of the leniency process.
204
 Conditional 
immunity precedes total or no immunity.
205
 
Paragraph 9.1.1.2 of the CLP states that the Commission will give the 
applicant total immunity after it has completed its investigation and referred the 
matter to the Tribunal and once a final determination has been made by the Tribunal  
or the Competition Appeal Court (‘the CAC’), provided of course, that the applicant 
has met the requirements and conditions as set out in the CLP. The Commission 
reserves the right to revoke conditional immunity at any stage prior to total immunity 
being granted where the applicant fails to co-operate or adhere to any conditions or 
requirements under the CLP.
206
 Although the courts seem to have presumed that the 
Commission will be entitled to refer a complaint against an applicant who acquired 
immunity if it emerges that the applicant has not complied with all conditions and 
requirements for immunity; it is doubtful that the Commission would be entitled to 
grant a conditional non-referral in this manner and be able to change its decision not 
to refer, especially where the complaint was not initiated by the Commission.
207
  
After granting conditional immunity the Commission will move ahead with 
its investigations and analyse and verify the information and evidence obtained from 
the applicant.
208
 During this process the firm is required to co-operate with the 
Commission and must continue to do so until investigations are finalised and any 
subsequent proceedings in the Tribunal are completed. The firm must provide the 
Commission with complete and accurate disclosure of information, documents and 
evidence it has relating to the cartel activity and must immediately desist from 
further engaging in cartel activity. It must also not alert other cartel members that it 
has applied for leniency.
209
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Once the Commission is satisfied that it has adequate information to institute 
proceedings it will call a final meeting with the applicant and inform it accordingly. 
The applicant is expected to continue to co-operate fully and expeditiously.
210
 
What is paramount to the applicant is the fact that where it has been granted 
immunity the Commission will not expose it to a hearing before the Tribunal for its 
involvement in the cartel and would consequently not request that any administrative 
fine be imposed on it.
211
 Although the CLP does not attach criminal liability for any 
competition law violations, it does not indemnify the applicant from any criminal 
liability imposed by any provision of the Act nor does it limit the rights of any party 
injured by the cartel activity to bring a civil action against the applicant for the harm 
which it has suffered as a result of the cartel conduct in respect of which the 
Commission granted immunity.
212
  
Total immunity will be granted to a successful applicant, once the Tribunal or 
CAC has reached a final decision in respect of the alleged cartel.
213
  
The CLP therefore serves to encourage cartel members to provide 
information to the Commission which would otherwise often go undetected for long 
periods of time. It is intended to be an effective and efficient tool for prosecuting 
firms involved in cartel activities and discouraging and or eliminating the formation 
of cartels.  
 
ii) Challenges to the CLP 
 
The CLP has not been without its challenges. Of particular relevance, is the 
challenge to the lawfulness of the CLP in granting conditional leniency and 
consequently to the lawfulness of evidence obtained pursuant thereto. These issues 
were discussed in the case of Agri Wire (Pty) Ltd v The Competition 
Commissioner
214
 in both the court a quo and the SCA. 
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In brief the facts of the matter were that the parent company of Consolidated 
Wire Industries (Pty) Ltd (“CWI”) was the subject of an investigation by the 
Commission. As a result a decision was taken to conduct internal investigations to 
ascertain whether any other company in the group had been involved in anti-
competitive conduct. CWI was one such company. CWI therefore approached the 
Commission in terms of the CLP and disclosed the alleged cartel and information it 
had pertaining to its operation. The Commission granted CWI conditional immunity. 
After conducting its own investigation it referred the allegations relating to the cartel 
to the Tribunal. Agri Wire was one of the firms cited as being involved in the alleged 
cartel by the Commission in its referral to the Tribunal. Although CWI was cited, the 
Commission explained that it did not seek relief against CWI as it had been granted 
conditional immunity in terms of the CLP; it was cited ‘purely for the interest it may 
have in [the] proceedings’.
215
 
The main contentions of Agri Wire’s case before the SCA as set out in Agri 
Wire’s founding affidavit were, inter alia, ‘whether or not it was competent for the 
[Commission] to make promises of conditional immunity to [CWI] to obtain 
evidence, and if it was not competent for it to do so, whether such evidence [was] 
inadmissible in subsequent proceedings’
216
. In other words the argument was that in 
light of the fact  that the Commission is a creature of statute, it cannot be selective in 
deciding which members of a cartel to investigate and refer to the Tribunal, nor can it 
grant immunity from an adverse adjudication and imposition of a penalty in return 
for information under the CLP as the Act does not authorise the Commission to do 
so.
217
 
The first question to ask is what is meant by ‘immunity’? The CLP provides 
that immunity means that the Commission will not subject a successful applicant to 
adjudication before the Tribunal for its role in the cartel and furthermore it would not 
impose a fine on that applicant.
218
 Adjudication is described as a referral of a Chapter 
2 contravention by the Commission to the Tribunal with a view to getting a 
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prescribed fine imposed on the wrongdoer. Prosecution is ascribed a similar 
meaning.
219
 
In the court a quo, Zondo J, who handed down the judgment, took the view 
that the Commission does not have the final say in respect of what happens to a 
cartel participant who applies for leniency under the CLP. It can merely request and 
recommend to the Tribunal not to impose a penalty but this would not be binding on 
the Tribunal as it has the ultimate authority to decide whether or not to grant the 
applicant relief.
220
 To adopt this approach to the CLP would be absurd and would 
undermine its efficacy. The effect of this approach would be that although an 
applicant is granted conditional immunity by the Commission, has co-operated fully 
with the investigation and the Commission has recommended against imposing an 
administrative penalty, the Tribunal, in exercising its discretion may, in any event, 
opt to impose a fine of up to 10 per cent of the firm’s annual turnover. No shrewd 
businessman is going to risk exposing a cartel without a guarantee that the firm will 
not be subjected to a fine. Fortunately, the SCA realised the potential pitfall of such 
an approach. The SCA highlighted the fact that the CLP repeatedly refers to the 
Commission as being the party to grant leniency and that there is no mention of the 
Tribunal as being the party to determine total immunity. It further pointed out that 
the distinction between conditional and total immunity would be irrational if the 
Tribunal was entitled to ignore the Commissions grant of conditional immunity to a 
party and impose on it an administrative penalty.
221
 
The SCA held that the real issue in question was whether the Act empowered 
the Commission to frame and adopt the CLP in such terms so as to provide for the 
granting of conditional and then final immunity to self-confessing cartels.
222
  
Agri Wire maintained that whilst the Commission was broadly speaking 
entitled to adopt a policy such as the CLP, it was not entitled to grant conditional 
immunity as this should be granted at the instance of the Tribunal in exercising its 
powers under section 59 of the Act in determining appropriate relief.
223
 The SCA 
however maintained that the Act specifically provides that the Commission is 
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responsible for implementing measures to encourage market transparency and to 
investigate and evaluate Chapter 2 contraventions
224
 (which includes involvement in 
prohibited practices). Cartel activity clearly undermines market transparency and 
therefore the Act must empower the Commission to put in place measures to perform 
its aforementioned functions. It follows that the Commission is entitled, under the 
Act, to adopt and implement the CLP by granting conditional and final immunity to a 
party who discloses cartel activity and provides evidence and co-operates in the 
investigation of the cartel.
225
 
The court a quo did not fully deal with the question whether the Commission 
may conclude agreements with parties against whom complaints have been made. 
Such an agreement would probably have to take the form of a consent order for it to 
be enforceable. Without this agreement, a person who has been granted immunity 
may still land up before the Tribunal for adjudication through a referral by an outside 
complainant or by the making of a new complaint by an aggrieved party where the 
Commission initiated the complaint.
226
 Even though this will give the Tribunal some 
discretion in terms of confirming the consent order, this discretion would be more 
limited than on the approach put forward by Zondo J.
227
 
Furthermore, it was contended by Agri Wire that section 59(3) which sets out 
various factors to be considered by the Tribunal in determining an appropriate 
penalty, including the degree to which the respondent co-operated with the 
Commission and Tribunal, illustrates that it is the Tribunal that decides whether 
immunity should be granted and not the Commission.
228
 The SCA held that there 
was no merit in this submission; it affirmed that although the Tribunal can take this 
factor into account in determining a penalty, it does not have the effect that the 
Commission may not grant immunity.
229
 It is submitted that the legislature did not 
intend for this section to mean that the Tribunal has exclusive authority to decide 
whether immunity should be granted; rather it is likely that it intended for this factor 
to be taken into account in determining the penalty for a party which has not acquired 
immunity. In other words, it is submitted, that a party’s willingness to co-operate will 
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be a relevant factor in assessing what percentage of its annual turnover should be 
levied against it as a penalty where it was unable to obtain immunity for not being 
‘first to the door’, as was the case in the Tiger Consumer Brands Ltd
230
 matter. It 
may also be a relevant factor where a firm is subjected to an administrative penalty 
as a result of immunity subsequently being revoked. To hold that the corollary of 
section 59(3)(f) is that the Tribunal decides whether to grant immunity would be to 
impute to it an unintended meaning. 
Agri Wire argued further that when the Commission refers a complaint to the 
Tribunal it is required to refer the entire complaint and it cannot be selective in 
referring only some cartel participants to adjudication before the Tribunal or seeking 
a penalty only in respect of some participants. Its objection was that ‘otherwise the 
playing fields [would not be] level and the party that obtained leniency would be 
unfairly advantaged’
231
.  
The practice of the Commission in referring a complaint to the Tribunal has 
been to include therein the conduct of the party who has received conditional 
immunity. The Commission has refrained from requesting any relief against that 
party and asserts that the party is cited merely for the interest which it may have in 
the proceedings.
232
 According to Zondo J, this practice means that the party who 
received immunity was before the Tribunal as was the complaint against that 
party.
233
 
The SCA dismissed this line of reasoning. It held that at the end of an 
investigation, the Commission may in accordance with its express statutory powers 
refer some or all of the particulars of the complaint and may exclude or add members 
of the cartel to the referral.
234
 However, doubt has been expressed as to whether 
section 50(3) which allows the Commission to refer parts of complaints where the 
complaint is not initiated by it, can be used as justification in all instances.
235
 On the 
other hand, if the Commission did not have the authority to exclude co-operative 
cartel members from the referral to the Tribunal, firms would be disinclined to 
volunteer information on cartel conduct which would in turn undermine the efficacy 
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and success of the CLP. Accordingly, the assertion that the grant of leniency to a 
party amounts to an unfair advantage makes little sense considering that the very 
purpose of the CLP is to offer firms an incentive to break rank and disclose cartel 
conduct. Moreover, the Commission is more concerned with identifying cartel 
conduct and bringing to an end such anti-competitive behaviour than ensuring that 
each member of the cartel receives a penalty. It ‘considers it more appropriate to 
forsake relief against one cartel member in exchange for uncovering and proceeding 
against the remainder of the cartel’
236
. 
 
iii) The Strengths and Shortcomings of the CLP 
 
The amendments effected by CLP have dealt with many of the weaknesses of the 
2004 CLP.  
The 2004 CLP allowed for too much discretion by the Commission in 
granting leniency which meant that firms were likely to be reluctant in coming 
forward as immunity was not guaranteed.
237
 However the CLP now provides for an 
almost automatic leniency in that the Commission is obliged to grant an applicant 
final immunity once its investigations have been finalised and the Tribunal or CAC 
has made a final decision in respect of the matter referred to it. The idea is to grant 
leniency because the applicant is ‘first to the door’ and not because it is considered as 
less of a cartelist than the other cartel members.
238
 
Overtime leadership in the cartel might change or the cartel members may 
have together taken the decision to form the cartel and this would make it difficult 
for a firm, acting in good faith, to qualify for leniency.
239
 Thus it is sensible that any 
member of a cartel is now entitled to approach the Commission for leniency and that 
firms which instigate cartels or which coerce other firms to join or remain in a cartel 
are no longer excluded from applying for leniency.  
The CLP also allows for a firm to apply for a marker thereby retaining its 
position as ‘first to the door’ for leniency while it collates evidence and information 
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to support its application which will have to be submitted to the Commission within 
certain time frames. Provided that the applicant adheres to these time periods and 
other requirements for immunity, the immunity application will be deemed to have 
been made on the date on which the marker was granted.
240
  
As a member of the International Competition Network, South Africa has to a 
large extent adhered to the recommended practices for leniency programs. In this 
regard, the CLP: 
a) makes leniency available both where the competition authorities are unaware 
of the cartel and where they are aware of the cartel but do not have sufficient 
evidence to proceed to adjudicate or prosecute; 
b) provides for the use of markers in the application process; 
c) requires full and frank disclosure and ongoing cooperation throughout the 
process by the applicant; and 
d) keeps the identity of the leniency applicant and any information provided by 
the leniency applicant confidential unless the leniency applicant provides a 
waiver, the agency is required by law to disclose the information, or the 
leniency applicant discloses its application.
241
 
The CLP does however have a number of weaknesses, many of which are 
similar to the difficulties and challenges faced by other developing countries. 
The ICN recommends that second and subsequent co-operating firms should 
also be given lenient treatment and this would be in keeping with the approach taken 
by a number of other jurisdictions. The advantage in this is that firms who have 
valuable evidence and do not want to disclose it for fear of reprisal may be more 
willing to assist the Commission.
242
 Whilst the CLP does allows for lenient treatment 
(less than full leniency) for second and subsequent co-operating cartel members in 
that they may be given a reduced fine or permitted to enter a settlement agreement or 
consent order, it is submitted there should be certainty as to the nature of the lenient 
treatment that will be received. For example, the CLP could provide for an automatic 
and pre-determined penalty discount for the second firm which furnishes the 
Commission with new and relevant information. 
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The Commission does not actively pursue joint or co-operative efforts and 
investigations with other countries. The ICN commends competition authorities 
which attempt to work with other jurisdictions in respect of preventing anti-
competitive behaviour and suggests that competition authorities could ask 
competition authorities in other jurisdictions whether the applicant has been granted 
leniency and what conditions have been imposed on it.
243
 It is proposed that the 
Commission would enjoy considerable success in detecting cartels where it co-
ordinated and corresponded with authorities in other jurisdictions. In return, the 
Commission could assist those jurisdictions by encouraging applicants to apply for 
leniency in those jurisdictions. 
Moreover, an applicant which has obtained immunity is still not protected 
from civil or criminal liability arising from the conduct in question. A third party 
who has suffered harm or damages may seek redress against the applicant.
244
 Thus 
immunity does not guarantee the applicant that it will be able to avoid all 
consequences for its conduct and in some instances this may be enough of a deterrent 
from coming forward. 
The CLP does not offer an applicant blanket immunity. Immunity from 
adjudication is only granted in respect of cartel related activities and not in respect of 
other contraventions under the Act.
245
 The result is that even where an applicant has 
obtained immunity in respect of a prohibited practice, the Commission may refer a 
complaint against the applicant to the Tribunal in relation to non-cartel 
infringements.
246
 In the matter of Clover Industries Ltd v Competition Commission
247
 
the Commission did exactly this and although the firm applied for dismissal of the 
referral on the basis of prejudice, the application was dismissed. The obvious 
problem for a firm in this position is that in terms of the CLP it is required to furnish 
the Commission with complete and truthful disclosure of all evidence in its 
possession relating to the cartel activity and must offer full and expeditious co-
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operation to the Commission
248
 whilst at the same time it must defend itself from 
prosecution by the Commission in respect of any non-cartel infringements. 
249
 
Although the South African CLP is still in its early stages it has overcome 
many of its initial teething problems and has achieved some notable successes as is 
evidenced by the increasing number of leniency applications made per year as 
depicted in the graph below:-
250
 
 
 
 
c) Criminal Sanctions 
 
One of the most effective means of deterring firms from engaging in prohibited 
practices is the imposition of sanctions or penalties where they are found guilty of 
engaging in such conduct.  
                                                 
248
 Corporate Leniency Policy 2008at  para 10. 
249
 P Sutherland & K Kemp op cit note 16 at 5-82(12). 
250
 Competition Commission ‘Annual Report 2011/2012’ available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Publications/Annual-Reports/COMPETITION-COMMISSION-
AR11-12-LOW-RESWITH-HYPERLINKS.pdf accessed on 19 June 2013. At the time of writing the 
2012/2013 Annual Report was not available. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Apr 2005 -
Mar 2006
Apr 2005 -
Mar 2007
Apr 2005 -
Mar 2008
Apr 2005 -
Mar 2009
Apr 2005 -
Mar 2010
Apr 2005 -
Mar 2011
Apr 2005 -
Mar 2012
Total Number of CLP Applications Received  Per Year 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
54 
 
 
 
The Act punishes cartel conduct by imposing an administrative penalty on the 
firm for involving itself in a prohibited practice under section 4(1)(b).
251
 The penalty 
may not exceed 10 per cent of the firm’s annual turnover in and its exports from the 
Republic during the firm’s preceding financial year.
252
 Factors that are taken into 
account when determining an appropriate fine include the nature, duration, gravity 
and extent of the contravention; the losses suffered or profits derived as a result of 
the contravention; the prevailing market conditions at the time when the 
contravention took place and the degree to which the respondent co-operated with 
the Commission and Tribunal.
253
  
Although administrative penalties may be very high as in the Tiger Consumer 
Brands Ltd 
254
 case where an administrative penalty in the amount of 5.7 per cent of 
the respondent’s turnover from baking operations nationally in the year of 2006 
equated to R98 784 869.90 (ninety eight million seven hundred and eighty four 
thousand eight hundred and sixty nine rand, ninety cents),
255
 they may still be 
inadequate to deter large wealthy firms. These large wealthy firms may well be in a 
position to absorb the penalties or may have the resources to appeal decisions or 
findings to the highest courts whilst continuing in the interim to derive benefits from 
the prohibited practice.
256
 Even in matters such as the Tiger Consumer Brands Ltd 
case where the respondent admits to being in contravention of section 4(1)(b),
257
 its 
directors were in no way held responsible. Rather it is, by and large, the firm’s 
employees, shareholders and consumers which bear the burden of the administrative 
penalty through lesser dividends, decreased share prices and job losses.
258
 
Evidently, the penal provisions were directed at firms who engaged in 
prohibited practises and were not aimed at examining or penalising the conduct of 
directors or those in control of the firm’s activities. It has been suggested that the Act 
may have initially been drafted in this manner so as to be in keeping with company 
law which distinguishes between the acts of a company and those in control of the 
                                                 
251
 Act 89 of 1998 as amended, section 61(1). 
252
 Ibid, section 61(2). 
253
Ibid, section 61(3). 
254
 1 CPLR 71 (CT). 
255
 Ibid, 75. 
256
 L Jordaan & PS Munyai ‘The Constitutional Implications of the New Section 73A of the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998’ (2011) 23 SA Merc LJ 197 at 205. 
257
 1 CPLR 71 (CT) at 74 – 75. 
258
 L Jordaan & PS Munyai op cit note 256 at 211. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
55 
 
 
 
management of the company - it is only in rare circumstances that individuals will be 
held liable for the acts of the company. 
259
 However, firms generally act through their 
directors and it is the directors who, despite their fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of the firm, by their conduct and direction involve the firm in prohibited 
practices.
260
 It seems to follow that holding directors responsible for engaging a firm 
in or turning a blind eye to a firm’s cartel related activities would go some way in 
deterring them from forming cartels or engaging in cartel conduct. As many other 
countries
261
 have already implemented measures to hold directors personally and/or 
criminally liable it is probably logical and expected that South Africa would follow 
this lead. 
Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009 establishes a 
criminal cartel offence and has the effect that it will no longer be possible for 
directors acting in their official capacities to avoid personal and criminal liability by 
hiding behind the corporate veil.
262
  However, this provision has not yet been 
promulgated. 
Section 73A(1)(a) provides:- 
 
‘A person commits an offence if, while being a director of a firm or while engaged or 
purporting to be engaged by a firm in a position having management authority within the 
firm, such person— 
a. caused the firm to engage in a prohibited practice in terms of section 4(1)(b); or 
b. knowingly acquiesced in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice in terms of 
section 4(1)(b).’ 
 
A director or a person having management authority may be prosecuted for 
an offence if the firm acknowledges in a consent order or the Tribunal or the CAC 
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has made a finding that the firm was engaged in price fixing, market allocation or 
collusive tendering.
263
 This acknowledgement in a consent order or finding by the 
CAC serves as prima facie proof in criminal proceedings against such persons that 
the firm engaged in a prohibited practice.
264
 
Any person convicted of an offence under section 73A is liable to a fine not 
exceeding R500 000.00 (five hundred thousand rand) or a prison sentence not 
exceeding 10 (ten) years, or both.
265
 Furthermore, a firm may not directly or 
indirectly pay any fine imposed on a director or person in a position of management 
authority who has been convicted of such an offence, or indemnify, reimburse, 
compensate or otherwise defray the expenses incurred by such person in defending 
against prosecution proceedings, unless the prosecution is abandoned or the person in 
question is acquitted.
266
 
One of the greatest concerns arising from the interplay between the 
administrative and criminal components of competition law is to what extent the 
introduction of this criminal offence will undermine the CLP. There is a very real 
risk that firms and individuals will be more reluctant to come forward and apply for 
leniency if there is a possibility they shall face criminal prosecution. Instead of 
increasing detection of cartels, the criminal sanction may result in them being driven 
further underground. 
Moreover, there is a good chance that where allegations are made that a firm 
is involved in a prohibited practice and a complaint is initiated or proceedings are 
instituted against it, firms will become more litigious. Even in circumstances where a 
consent order could be signed firms may rather opt to vigorously defend themselves 
so as to guard against its directors and managing officer being criminally prosecuted, 
especially because it's usually those very people who decide whether to proceed with 
litigation. In addition, as competition is a relatively untested area of law there is lots 
of room for matters to be challenged and appeals to be brought and argued over. 
Subsections (i) and (ii) below will outline some of the issues with section 73A which 
could result in a greater potential for litigation such as difficulties of interpretation 
and the constitutionality of section 73A. The upshot is that the Commission will be 
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drawn into protracted and costly legal proceedings, instead of a swift resolution of 
the matter. Therefore, unless section 73A is properly understood by firms and their 
directors and managing officers, it could potentially have the counter effect of 
undermining the CLP.  
 
i) Interpretation and Understanding of Section 73A 
 
In order to convict a person under section 73A all elements of the offence must be 
proved. However there are various ways of understanding and interpreting some of 
these elements which has the potential to create confusion and result in differing 
applications until such time as the Tribunal or CAC give direction in this regard.  
What is first noticeable is that section 73A applies only to directors and 
persons in a position having management authority. This is in contrast to most other 
criminal offences which do not make the omission or commission of an act a crime 
on the basis of the category or class of person who commits the act.
267
 It is 
implausible that a firm could engage in cartel activities without such persons being 
aware and given that they owe a fiduciary duty to the firm
268
 it is sensible that the 
application of section 73A is restricted in this way.  
Whilst it is clear who will qualify as a director of a firm, the same cannot be 
said about a person ‘in a position having management authority within the firm’.
269
 It 
is suggested that one possible way of determining who has management authority 
would be to rely on the established principles and rules of attribution in company law 
where there is history of jurisprudence for ascertaining who is the ‘directing mind 
and will’
270
 of a firm. South African common law would be instructive in 
determining where control and management of the firm resides in a person ranking 
lower than a director.
271
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Section 73A(1)(a) requires a prosecution to prove that a director or person 
with management authority ‘caused’ the firm to engage in the prohibited practice
272
 
and this causation must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The wording of the 
sections begs the question what evidence will be acceptable for proving causation? 
Would mere attendance at a cartel meeting suffice or would hard evidence be 
required, for example that such person structured and instigated the cartel on behalf 
of the firm?
273
 
Furthermore section 73A(1)(a) requires the director or managing officer to 
have ‘knowingly acquiesced’ in the firm engaging in the prohibited practice. 
‘Knowingly acquiesced’ means having acquiesced while having actual knowledge of 
the relevant conduct by the firm [emphasis added].
274
  
The present meaning of ‘knowingly acquiesced’ can be contrasted to the meaning 
it was given under the Competition Amendment Bill
275
 (“the Bill”) wherein it was 
held that ‘knowingly acquiesced’ meant:- 
 
(a) ‘having actual knowledge of the relevant conduct by the firm; or  
(b) being in a position in which the person reasonably ought to have— 
i. had actual knowledge of the facts contemplated in paragraph (a); or 
ii. investigated the matter to an extent that could have provided such person 
with actual knowledge of the facts contemplated in paragraph (a); or 
iii. taken other measures which, if taken, could reasonably be expected to have 
provided such person with actual knowledge of the facts contemplated in 
paragraph (a).’
276
 
  
The Bill under subparagraph (b) introduced the concept of constructive 
knowledge in terms whereof a director or managing officer ought to have known or 
ought to have taken steps so that he could reasonably be expected to obtain such 
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knowledge.
277
 This section was omitted from the Amendment Act leaving only the 
notion of actual knowledge as being a requirement. As the doctrine of constructive 
knowledge does not apply, inferences cannot be made about what such person ought 
to have known.  
Case law can also be enlightening as to what is meant by ‘knowingly’ or 
‘actual knowledge’. In the case of Du Plessis NO v Oosthuizen
278
 it was held that 
‘“knowingly” indicate[s] action accompanied by the full knowledge of the facts’
279
. 
If section 73A were to be given this narrow meaning the result would be that 
directors or managing officers would only be guilty of an offence when they caused a 
firm to engage in cartel activities or they had full knowledge of all aspects of the 
cartel activity.
280
  
Interpreting section 73A strictly has the potential to lead to inappropriate 
outcomes. For example, a director or managing officer may be able to avoid liability 
on the basis that he lacks actual or full knowledge. Circumstances could then arise 
where a director or managing officer instructs a subordinate to attend the meetings 
regarding price fixing and to implement the necessary measures in his stead with the 
very intention of escaping liability on this basis.
281
 Disputing actual knowledge may 
be fairly simple unless the prosecuti n has hard evidence, adding to this difficulty is 
that the phrasing of this section allows for the possibility of disputing 
acquiescence.
282
 Therefore the inclusion of knowledge in the form of dolus 
eventualis may be a less onerous interpretation of ‘knowingly’ which neither imputes 
knowledge to the person in question nor results in absurdities.  
Knowledge in the form of dolus eventualis is generally understood as a party 
having subjective foresight of the reasonable or real possibility that the conduct or 
course of conduct would result in harm and the party reconciles himself to that fact 
and nevertheless proceeds or continues with that conduct.
283
 It is possible that dolus 
eventualis could fall within the realm of actual knowledge because the person in 
question subjectively foresaw the real possibility of harm occurring as a result of his 
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conduct, as compared with constructive knowledge where knowledge of the 
reasonable person is imputed to the party in question.
284
  
Of course, the counter argument would be that the legislature purposefully 
omitted the notion of constructive knowledge from the Amendment Act and provided 
for a narrow understanding of ‘knowingly’. Hence, if they had intended to 
incorporate dolus eventualis into the concept of ‘knowingly’ they would have done 
so expressly. 
 
ii) Constitutional Issues relating to Section 73A 
 
Criminalising competition law has not only resulted in challenges relating to the 
interpretation and understanding of section 73A but it has also elicited debate as to 
whether it impinges on constitutional rights, such as the right to a fair trial. 
Directors and managing officers may be wary of coming forward and 
disclosing information relating to their firm’s engagement in cartel conduct or other 
cartel activities for fear of self-incrimination and for fear of that evidence being used 
against them in subsequent criminal proceedings under section 73A.
285
 The right to a 
fair trial, including the rights to be presumed innocent and not to be compelled to 
give self-incriminating evidence, arise from the moment a person is arrested and thus 
it could be argued that these rights may be infringed should a director or managing 
officer disclose such information in terms of a leniency application.  
In the United Kingdom, where the Office of Fair Trading (‘the OFT’) (being 
the body concerned with both the administrative and criminal enforcement of 
competition law in the UK) conducts investigations in both respects, evidence 
obtained pursuant to administrative proceedings cannot be used in criminal 
proceedings, although the converse is possible.
286
 Given that this principle already 
exists in South African law it is submitted that the competition authorities should 
adopt the same approach to evidence in competition matters. The view as espoused 
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in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others
287
 is that ‘as long as incriminating evidence is not 
admissible at the criminal trial and the use of “derivative evidence” at such trial is 
made dependent on the use being subject to “fair criminal standards”, the rule against 
self-incrimination is adequately protected’
288
. Although, the aforesaid matter was 
decided in the context of civil proceedings it seems likely that the same reasoning 
would be applied to proceedings of an administrative nature. This view is reinforced 
having regard to section 49A(3) in terms whereof self-incriminating statements made 
in response to a summons by the Commission investigating a cartel are generally 
inadmissible as evidence against that person in criminal proceedings. Self-
incriminating evidence provided by a director or managing officer in disclosing 
cartel conduct or during proceedings against a firm which has engaged in a 
prohibited practice should not be used in criminal proceedings and in this way the 
competition authorities could steer clear of a constitutional challenge on the basis of 
an infringement of the fair trial rights.  
It is apparent that where an acknowledgement in a consent order is obtained 
or a finding is made by the Tribunal or CAC that the firm engaged in a prohibited 
practice, this constitutes prima facie proof in proceedings against a director or 
managing officer that the firm engaged in such conduct.
289
 In other words, it creates 
a presumption that the firm has engaged in cartel conduct.  
Where a presumption creates a reverse onus of proof it can lead to it being 
challenged for lack of constitutionality. In S v Coetzee
290
 it was held that it is always 
for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person and that the proof must 
be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
291
 The function of the reverse onus is to relieve 
the prosecution from proving all elements of the offence with which the accused was 
charged and once the presumption is established the onus of disproving it falls on the 
accused.
292
 Presumptions which fall into the category of reverse onus are held to 
infringe the accused’s right to be presumed innocent as envisaged by section 25(3) of 
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the Constitution
293
 and have been struck down by the Constitutional Court again and 
again.  
The presumption created by section 73A(5) relieves the National Prosecution 
Authority (‘the NPA’), when prosecuting a director or managing officer, of the 
burden of having to re-prove a section 4(1)(b) infringement which has already been 
established by the competition authorities. The consequence is that the person being 
prosecuted cannot contend that section 4(1)(b) was not infringed and it therefore 
limits the defences available to him.
294
 It is maintained that the presumption does not 
create a reverse onus and accordingly does not infringe the accused’s right to be 
presumed innocent. It does not have the effect that the accused must discharge the 
presumption in order to avoid being convicted. The NPA still bears the onus of 
proving all other elements of the offence, namely that the person in question caused 
or knowingly acquiesced in the firm engaging in a prohibited practice beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
295
 Essentially, the presumption relates only to the conduct of the 
firm and not to that of a director or person in a management position.  It seems 
highly unlikely that a constitutional challenge to section 73A(5) on the grounds that 
it infringes the presumption of innocence would succeed. 
Section 73A(6) provides that it is impermissible for a firm to come to a 
director or managing officer’s aid where he is convicted of an offence and assist with 
paying any administrative fine imposed. The implication is that those in charge of 
shareholder’s funds cannot get assistance from the firm. The wording of section 
73A(6)(b) is phrased widely enough so that even where a firm raises finance or 
provides security for the costs of the proceedings it is probable that it will fall within 
the scope of the section.
296
 The section is curtailed by the proviso ‘unless the 
prosecution is abandoned or the person is acquitted’ but this proviso itself requires 
clarification. It could be construed as meaning that a firm may provide its directors or 
managing officers with pecuniary assistance in putting up a defence on condition that 
these funds are repaid if a finding is made against the director or managing officer.
297
 
It could also mean that the director or managing officer must cover his own legal 
costs but where the prosecution is abandoned for whatsoever reason or where the 
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Tribunal or CAC finds that the director or managing officer is not guilty of a section 
73A offence, he can recoup  the costs from the firm.
298
 The latter seems to be more in 
line with the purpose of the section and is probably more easily enforceable.
299
 Issues 
pertaining to the constitutionality of the section arise where such person is both the 
director of the firm and a shareholder because preventing him from borrowing 
money from the firm (especially where it is his only source of revenue) may be held 
to infringe his constitutional right to a fair trial.
300
 It is probable that section 73A(6) 
will come under scrutiny in legal proceedings in due course. 
 
iii) The Interplay between the Commission and the NPA 
 
In terms of section 179(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the 
NPA is empowered to ‘institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the state, and to 
carry out any necessary functions incidental to instituting criminal proceedings
301
’. In 
keeping with these powers the NPA has exclusive powers to enforce section 73A.
302
 
From section 73A(3) it is evident however that the NPA may only prosecute a person 
in terms of this section where the firm has acknowledged in a consent order or the 
Tribunal or CAC has made a finding that the firm engaged in a prohibited practice. 
Clearly, the competition authorities which have been established to enforce an 
economic statute have a completely different role from the NPA; nevertheless the 
parameters of their functions are not wholly manifest in the competition law arena. 
This raises questions as to whether it is appropriate to incorporate criminal sanctions 
in competition law.  
The NPA should ensure that the prosecution process is fair and transparent. It 
has its own prosecutorial policies for deciding whether or not to prosecute and should 
only proceed ‘when a case is well founded upon evidence reasonably believed to be 
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reliable and admissible’
303
. When making a fair decision to prosecute, the NPA may 
take account of various public interest factors including the nature and seriousness of 
the offence, including the impact that it has on the community; the interest of the 
victim and the broader community and the circumstances of the offender, including 
admissions of guilt, repentance or willingness to co-operate with the authorities.
304
 
Section 50(1) of the Act holds that the Commission may after receiving or 
initiating a complaint certify a particular respondent or person as deserving of 
leniency, with or without conditions,
305
 in that the person in question provided 
information to the Commission or otherwise co-operated with the Commission’s 
investigation of an alleged prohibited practice to the satisfaction of the 
Commission
306
. In other words, it purports to extend leniency to directors or 
managing officers in prosecution proceedings where they have assisted the 
authorities.   
It has been proposed that in terms of section 73A(4) it is predominantly the 
Commission’s decision to determine whether or not the criminal prosecution of a 
director is suitable.
307
 It is submitted however that this viewpoint is inaccurate and no 
ultimate power is given to the Commission to grant leniency or immunity from 
criminal prosecution. It would seem that the Commission’s role is more passive – 
where a person has not been certified as deserving of leniency, it plays no role in the 
decision to prosecute and where a person has been certified as deserving of leniency 
the Commission may not seek or request that the person be prosecuted but may make 
submissions to the NPA in support of leniency of that person where he is being 
prosecuted for a section 73A offence
308
. The wording of the section does not lead to 
the inference that the Commission may, in any circumstances, dictate or recommend 
the NPA to institute criminal proceedings. Thus notwithstanding the fact that the 
Commission may make submissions to the NPA for leniency, the NPA must still 
exercise its own discretion whether or not to prosecute and must do so free of 
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interference or influence.
309
 The reality may be that the NPA is guided by the advices 
of the Commission but there is no guarantee that this will be the case. For example, it 
was stated above that one of the factors taken into account by the NPA in deciding 
whether to prosecute is the accused’s willingness to co-operate. This factor aligns 
with section 50(1) in so far as it requires a director or managing officer to provide 
information or to co-operate with the Commission’s investigation in order to qualify 
for leniency.
310
 In certain instances though the factors considered by the NPA may 
not accord with the circumstances in which the Commission will hold a person to be 
deserving of leniency and thus the Commission will have to frame its submissions to 
the NPA in line with its prosecutorial policies if it wishes them to be of use and to be 
taken into consideration by the NPA.
311
  
The failure of the Amendment Act to detail the relationship between the NPA 
and the Commission may result in uncertainty as to how cases should be handled 
between the two bodies. In particular it will lead to concerns of expertise, co-
ordination of cartel matters and the issue of state resources.
312
 The South African 
criminal justice system is already overburdened and is hardly likely to give such 
matters the attention they require. Public prosecutorial bodies tend to lack expertise 
in competition law and do not understand the intricacies and nuances thereof; the 
NPA will no doubt find itself in the same position. It seems probable that these 
competition matters will end up being dealt with by the Specialised Commercial 
Crimes Unit which usually deals with corporate statutory offences.
313
 If it is this arm 
of the NPA that prosecutes individuals under section 73A, it is scarcely likely to have 
sufficient resources or expertise available to properly and effectively investigate 
cartels. It is therefore argued that the Competition Commission which has the 
requisite knowledge and expertise should be given a greater role in the investigation 
and prosecution of these matters. Issues of expertise could largely be avoided by 
allowing the competition authorities to handle both the administrative and criminal 
aspects of competition law enforcement, as has been done in other countries. 
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The Commission has entered into Memorandums of Understanding with 
other institutions such as the Council for Medical Schemes and the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa which set guidelines for their co-
operation in areas of overlapping or complementary jurisdiction.
314
 It is hoped that 
the Commission will enter into a similar type of Memorandum of Understanding 
with the NPA so as to provide clarity and insight as to how the two institutions 
intend working together. 
 
iv) The Effect of the Criminal Sanction 
 
In light of the above difficulties, it must be questioned whether a criminal penalty is 
justifiable and should be promulgated or whether there is not some other more 
appropriate mechanism for contending with directors and managing officers who are 
instrumental in their firm’s cartel related activities. In other words, is there not a less 
restrictive means of holding directors or managing officers personally accountable? 
One option which has been put forward is for that person to be disqualified as a 
director or from holding a managerial position.
315
 In terms of section 69(8) of the 
Companies Act, it provides that a person may be disqualified as a director where a 
court has prohibited that person from being a director or has declared him to be 
delinquent in terms of section 162
316
. The wording of section 162 is probably broad 
enough to encompass instances where a director caused or knowingly acquiesced in 
the firm engaging in a prohibited practice. Another possibility would be to impose 
administrative penalties on not only the firm but also on the director or managing 
officer in his personal capacity. As mentioned above, in terms of the new Brazilian 
Competition Act, law 12.529/2011 directors of firms may be subjected to a prison 
sentence and a fine ranging from 1 per cent to 20 per cent of the fine imposed on the 
firm.
317
 In the United Kingdom, the Enterprise Act provides for a term of 
imprisonment of up to 5 (five) years to be imposed or an unlimited fine.
318
 The 
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submission here is that a fine could possibly be imposed on the director as an 
alternative, rather than in addition, to imprisonment and accordingly the limit of the 
fine should possibly be higher than that set by CADE in Brazil, if not unlimited. The 
director’s involvement in the cartel, the cartel’s duration, its impact on the relevant 
industry, the director’s subsequent co-operation and so forth are factors which could 
be taken into account in determining a maximum fine. Given that section 73A(6) 
proscribes firms from assisting them, an administrative penalty which could have 
serious financial implications for the person in question may also be a practical way 
in which to deter membership in cartels. 
The inclusion of a criminal sanction is however generally seen as a positive 
step because of the effect that it has on deterrence. However some of its 
inadequacies, such as its failure to detail the relationship between the Commission 
and the NPA resulting in it detracting from the CLP, its vague requirements of 
causation and knowing acquiescence and the constitutional issues will have to be 
dealt with and clarified in order for the offence to be more effective. Until such time 
as the Commission and NPA streamline the procedures for corporate leniency and 
immunity from prosecution more delays can be expected in the promulgation of this 
provision.  
Furthermore, the introduction of a criminal offence must be embraced for 
bringing the South African competition law more in line with a number of other 
developed countries. The impact of the criminal sanction is already evidenced by 
looking at the increased number of leniency applications since the inception of the 
Amendment Act. From April 2005 to March 2009, a total of 28 leniency applications 
were received. From April 2009 to March 2012, 356 leniency applications have been 
received, with 244 of those being in the last 12 month period.
319
 Whilst this huge 
increase probably cannot be solely attributed to the inclusion of a criminal sanction, 
it would be short-sighted to assume that it has not been a contributing factor.  
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VII. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPOSING CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
Notwithstanding that both the OECD and the ICN have recommended to its members 
that criminal penalties be used in cartel enforcement, those countries which have 
implemented criminal sanctions in some form have little history of major criminal 
prosecutions despite the number of cartel cases.
320
 
Whether criminal sanctions can be said to have a powerful deterrent effect is 
debatable. One has to question whether the benefits of imposing a criminal sanction, 
which is in essence the deterrent effect, exceeds the costs occasioned by a criminal 
system in running matters involving anti-competitive behaviour by cartels - including 
the costs of prosecution, prison administration and so forth.  
What is evident from looking at the experiences of developing countries is 
that in order for criminal cartel enforcement to be effective there has to be 
cooperation between the competition authorities and the public prosecution. The 
public prosecution will require additional training and up-skilling in the area of 
competition law. Moreover, criminal proceedings should run in conjunction with or 
parallel to other competition enforcement programs such as leniency policies so as 
not to undermine them or detract from their effectiveness. The criminal cartel offence 
must also be clearly defined so that cartel members can be aware of what conduct is 
considered unlawful and the risks associated with engaging in such conduct.  
The very fact that a criminal offence has been included by some jurisdictions 
into their leniency programs is a matter of controversy. The argument is that 
competition law is regulatory in nature. It is indicative of state policy and a state’s 
willingness to intervene in economic and social activities.
321
 Sanctions in 
competition law are there to deter participation in cartel activity whereas criminal 
offences are seen to be retributive in nature and highlight the moral wrong of an 
offence.
322
 By bringing criminal sanctions into a civil law area there is the 
heightened concern for directors or managers that their conduct may fall within the 
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ambit of the criminal offence and this may cause a ‘chilling effect’ on competitive 
commercial conduct to the detriment of the firm and consumers.
323
 
When directors or managing officers involve their firms in cartels they weigh 
up the value of the cartel against the risk of a fine being imposed on the company, 
and in some instances the value may well outweigh any potential administrative fine. 
On the other hand, where there is the possibility of a criminal sanction the scale may 
weigh down on the other side because a director or managing officer is less likely to 
conclude that membership in a cartel outweighs a sanction which includes the 
deprivation of his personal liberty.
324
  
In essence competition law exists to protect and promote consumer welfare. 
Imposing a criminal sanction cannot be linked to any direct benefit or advantage to 
the consumer whereas in situations where a competition authority finds against a 
firm it is compelled to cease and desist from participating in anticompetitive conduct 
and the proceeds of the fine may be used to compensate victims or go towards the 
competition authority’s budget (which will benefit the consumer whether directly or 
indirectly).  
Moreover, there is a very real concern that the inclusion of a criminal 
sanction will detract from a country’s leniency program. Although a director or 
managing officer may be less likely to involve a firm in a cartel at the outset, for 
those who are already implicated there is a great possibility that they will avoid 
bringing a leniency application if they may still be prosecuted and sentenced to 
prison, even though the firm may be granted leniency. The effect is that cartels will 
become more secretive and are less likely to be detected and anti-competitive 
conduct will go unpunished.
325
 The fear of being prosecuted will also impede on 
legal proceedings because directors will be wary in giving testimony for fear of 
incriminating themselves (especially where they are unsure if their conduct 
constitutes an offence) and the evidence being used against them by the public 
prosecutors.
326
 Accordingly, it is suggested that leniency policies and cartel offences 
should be better aligned and leniency programs should allow for criminal leniency 
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and provide clarity as to when a director or managing officer will qualify for 
immunity from criminal prosecution. 
It is arguable that criminal sanctions work well in developed countries 
because the judiciary has the willingness and ability to enforce them. The judiciary in 
a developing country is usually under resourced and faces a back-log of crimes 
which may be regarded as more serious in nature.
327
 Criminal sanctions may be 
perceived as being too harsh and disproportionate to the crime. In addition, newly 
established competition authorities will have a better chance of meeting the threshold 
of a balance of probabilities than proving a criminal offence beyond reasonable 
doubt, hence it is argued, that it is surely better to have administrative penalties that 
will actually be applied than wasting time and resources on trying to meet this higher 
threshold for a criminal sanction.
328
 
Another mechanism for deterring cartel activity is, in addition to fines, to 
impose other penalties, as has been done in Brazil. For example, firms could be 
excluded from public procurement procedures, trade licences revoked, restrictions 
placed on tax benefits, negative publicity and restitution orders given. Furthermore 
individuals who are found to be implicated could be barred from serving as a director 
or public officer of a company or on the other hand, could receive rewards where 
they inform the authorities of cartel activity, as has been done in Korea.  
Whether a country opts for one of these alternative methods of enforcement 
will depend on a number of factors such as the relevant competition authority’s 
resources, its enforcement history and success rates and the relationship between the 
competition authorities, public prosecutors and courts. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has served to provide an overview of the leniency policies and criminal 
sanctions that have been adopted in Korea and Brazil. In considering their 
experiences South Africa can see what has and has not worked in other developing 
countries and can learn from their experiences.  
It is clearly evident from the experiences of Korea, Brazil and South Africa 
that in order for a developing country to have a successful leniency policy there must 
be vigorous enforcement to ensure a high risk of detection. There must be strong 
penalties attached to violations to incentivise members to self-report, in other words 
the cost of getting caught must outweigh the value of the cartel. These factors will 
create a race to be 'first to the door'.  
The leniency policy and the ensuing processes should be clear and transparent 
so that applicants can be aware of the risks and ben fits which they face and can 
predict whether they will be able to obtain leniency, how they will be treated and the 
likely consequences. It is also important that a high level of trust be cultivated with 
regard to concerns of confidentiality and protection. 
It is apparent that co-operation with developed countries can play an 
important role in detecting cartels and it is submitted that South Africa should 
endeavour to work more closely and consistently with other jurisdictions. 
In particular South Africa should consider the possibility of offering a set 
discount penalty to the second firm which furnishes the Commission with new 
evidence so that the Commission can better investigate the cartel and bring its 
activities to an end. This would appear to be a reasonable measure to implement 
given that the Commission is more concerned with preventing cartelisation than 
penalising participants.  
Another factor which requires further debate is the extent to which immunity 
will be granted. This is especially so given that a firm will not receive immunity in 
respect of other contraventions under the Act and that third parties may still bring a 
claim against the firm for harm it suffers arising from the prohibited practice. In a 
similar way, the criminal sanction as provided for in section 73A undercuts the CLP 
to some extent. 
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As has been illustrated by the experiences of Korea, Brazil and South Africa, 
enforcement of criminal sanctions can be very difficult. Enforcement of the criminal 
sanction lies predominantly in the hands of the public prosecutors who have neither 
the time, resources nor the skills to effectively pursue competition matters, let alone 
complex cartel activities. In order for criminal sanctions to be of any value it is 
pertinent that the role and functions of the public prosecutors and competition 
authorities must be clearly defined and they should undertake to co-operate and in so 
far as it is possible to run joint or parallel proceedings. If this cannot be achieved it is 
submitted that it would be preferable for criminal enforcement in competition matters 
to be dealt with by the competition authorities. 
Moreover, the provisions of section 73A need to be further clarified so as to 
remove any uncertainty as to the meaning of the section or as to how it should be 
applied. Addressing these issues will also remove any questions as to the 
constitutionality of the section. 
Whilst the inclusion of a criminal sanction is controversial, there are certainly 
advantages to it, most importantly the fact that it has the effect of increasing self-
reporting and encouraging cartel members to apply for leniency. In order to be more 
effective the problematic aspects of criminal sanctions will have to be resolved by 
each country having regard to its legal procedures, economy, culture and history. 
Where a developing country makes provision for these difficulties and addresses 
them taking into account their own systems and cultures and not by merely importing 
the law of foreign jurisdictions this will no doubt benefit competition law 
enforcement in the long run. 
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